Overcoming Political Exclusion

Strategies for marginalized groups to successfully engage in political decision-making
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Jenny Hedström
Julian Smith
Increasing marginalized people’s participation in political decision-making, whether in the customary or conventional governance sphere, is important for a number of reasons, not least because exclusion and discrimination of these groups have been a key factor in political and civil conflict. Equal and inclusive participation of a diverse citizenry in public and private life is a fundamental aspect of a peaceful and just society. Thus, improving opportunities for previously marginalized groups to participate in democratic institutions and mechanisms has often had a conflict-prevention effect.

However, majority communities sometimes react with resentment to the inclusion of marginalized groups. Indeed dealing with the potential backlash from dominant groups is one of the many challenges that I found myself dealing with in my work as a Minister with the Government of Sweden, as well as during my tenure as a member of the European Commission and at the United Nations. While reading through this International IDEA publication titled *Overcoming Political Exclusion: Strategies for marginalized groups to successfully engage in political decision-making*, I have been reminded of many of these challenges. A resource of this nature would have provided some useful insights into strategies to overcome such obstacles. Importantly, the insights communicated in this publication are from people themselves confronting human rights injustices, narrating in their own voices the discrimination they have faced. These injustices range from long-standing discrimination and in some cases exploitation of women and girls in customary governance to the exclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersexual people in the context of conventional governance. As I have noted in my work with the European Commission, participatory and effective democratic practice requires that policy makers actively listen to the citizenry, and in particular, people’s experiences of discriminatory practices.

The publication’s reference to understanding the inter-linkages between poverty, illiteracy, marginalization and political exclusion while adopting comprehensive, multi-tiered approaches to overcoming exclusion and
discrimination, is particularly important in the context of women and in advancing notions of inclusion, diversity and tolerance.

Similarly, changing education curricula so that human rights principles, particularly those promoting respect for and tolerance of difference are integrated into educational experiences from a very early age is vital if, for example, the gendered stereotypes and associated patriarchy we are trying to dismantle is to be effective in the longer term. I am glad that this theme receives prominence throughout the publication.

The publication’s reference to women confronting and ultimately working with religious, clan or political leaders to overcome exclusion provides some valuable examples of concrete strategies that can be replicated elsewhere. I have also been struck by the importance the publication places on marginalized groups gaining entry into parliaments and the necessity for members of these groups to monitor and overcome political parties and traditional power brokers’ exclusive gate-keeping practices.

I can highly recommend this publication for readers involved in democracy promotion and in advancing marginalized people’s genuine political participation.

Margot Wallström
Chair of International IDEA’s Board of Advisers
Increasing marginalized people’s participation in politics and securing their access to political life is of particular importance to democratic development and sustainability. In order to achieve this, we need to understand the barriers preventing inclusion in both customary and democratic governance and identify effective measures based on successful examples in overcoming exclusion from political decision-making.

The marginalized groups included in this publication comprise: members of religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities; people facing caste-based discrimination; people with disabilities; young people; indigenous peoples; those from remote geographic locations; and people discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexual orientation.

It is particularly important for effective governance that political institutions are inclusive and responsive, responding to a wide spectrum of social groups. In this context, International IDEA is committed to promoting the participation and representation of marginalized groups experiencing exclusion from political decision-making in both customary and conventional governance, and specifically, their engagement in local, national and international political institutions.

The literature examining ways in which non-customary decision-making structures and institutions are biased against marginalized people’s equal participation in governance has focused largely on the Global North rather than the Global South, while very few studies identifying barriers working against marginalized people’s participation in customary governance have emerged providing conclusive lessons. Even fewer studies have identified and described positive examples of marginalized people succeeding in moving from decision-making exclusion to inclusion in either customary or non-customary political systems.
To this end, *Overcoming Political Exclusion: Strategies for marginalized groups to successfully engage in political decision-making* identifies critical factors preventing marginalized people’s inclusion in customary and democratic decision-making structures and demonstrates how marginalized people have worked with other stakeholders in overcoming barriers to their participation.

The publication details the specific strategies marginalized people and their advocates have adopted - including direct action strategies in Somaliland, coercive ‘belly politics’ in south-east Nigeria, ‘soft’ advocacy strategies in Cambodia and the utilization of Koranic verses and constitutional rights in community education campaigns in India’s Rajasthan and Karnataka states. From these strategies the publication identifies lessons that other groups engaged in overcoming similar obstacles to inclusion reforms can consider adopting.

The 38 case studies referred to throughout the publication gather together knowledge and practical experience from the Global South, drawing on the efforts of marginalized people and other inclusion reform stakeholders to identify the ways in which marginalized people can impact on political processes through their participation in campaigns for equality in customary and democratic politics.

Our thanks go to the case study authors for their rigorous research yielding a very rich, insightful and varied collection of lessons for democratic cooperation and reform practitioners and policymakers.

We also thank International IDEA’s Member States, without whose support this publication would not have been possible.

We trust that all our readers, including those involved in the practical work of democracy support and advancing marginalized people’s political participation, will find this an illuminating and insightful publication.

International IDEA
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## Acronyms and abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>BWU</td>
<td>Burmese Women’s Union</td>
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<td>CEDEP</td>
<td>Centre for the Development of People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>community-based organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONAIE</td>
<td>Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECUARUNARI</td>
<td>Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa Nationality (Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Commissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Integrated Development Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>information and communication technology</td>
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<td>International IDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWO</td>
<td>Karen Women’s Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>People and Community Empowerment (PEACE) Foundation Melanesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWI</td>
<td>Muslim Women’s Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDA</td>
<td>quarter development association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UPR</td>
<td>Universal Periodic Review</td>
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Executive summary

This publication is based on the findings of 38 case studies commissioned by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in late 2011. The case studies illustrate the ways in which marginalized groups experiencing political exclusion in either customary or conventional governance manage to overcome—or partly overcome—their exclusion from political decision-making processes.

The focus here on strategies underpinning marginalized groups’ transition from political exclusion to increased inclusion is based on International IDEA’s commitment to prioritizing political participation and representation as a key impact area in its work. The inclusion of marginalized groups in the political processes of both conventional democratic and customary governance is an important part of this work. In addition, a review of the literature on good practice in facilitating the transition from political exclusion to inclusion shows that models developed by academic and non-academic studies largely fail to suggest replicable frameworks or innovative solutions for including marginalized groups in political decision-making, particularly in the Global South. Furthermore, this literature rarely analyses the positive steps taken—by marginalized groups and by their advocates—to achieve inclusion in governance settings.

Most case studies were completed in March 2012, and reflect the range of challenges marginalized groups encounter in their journeys from political exclusion to inclusion, together with the strategies and tactics deployed in successfully negotiating these challenges. The case studies capture the insights and analyses of members of religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities; people facing caste-based discrimination; people with disabilities; young people; indigenous peoples; people from remote geographic locations; and people discriminated against on the basis of their gender and sexual orientation. Geographically, the case studies cover all Global South regions, with the majority coming from sub-Saharan Africa (18 case studies), South Asia (6) and South-East Asia (7). Other case studies cover the Middle East (2 case studies), the Caucusus (2), the Pacific Islands (2) and Latin America (1).
Authors employed a number of information-gathering techniques including questionnaire-based surveys, interviews with key informants and affected marginalized group members, analyses of relevant statistical data and reviews of recent literature. Importantly, the authors also identified policy implications and other lessons from their respective analyses including, where relevant, the implications for marginalized groups striving to overcome barriers to their inclusion in democratic and customary governance elsewhere in the world.

An analysis of the case studies reveals many lessons for inclusion reformers, be they policymakers at the government level, marginalized group members and activists, civil society members or external partners concerned with overcoming political exclusion.

At the broader level of analysis, several important lessons emerge. First, there is a need to understand the inter-linkages between poverty, illiteracy, marginalization and political exclusion and adopt a comprehensive, multi-tiered approach to overcoming exclusion—including, if necessary, at all tiers of government. Second, many case studies recommended addressing gaps in constitutional and legislative rights, poverty and illiteracy through education interventions connected to livelihoods and other poverty-alleviating initiatives, together with confidence-building political leadership training for marginalized group members. Third, it is important that reform initiatives ensure the dominant culture’s readiness to accept and indeed celebrate marginalized groups’ contributions through community education programmes reversing stigmatization, discrimination, exploitation and political exclusion. Fourth, these reforms will only succeed when based on alliances and networks built by forming supportive relationships with opinion influencers such as key political and religious leaders and media representatives, and by training these stakeholders so that momentum gathers for change in leadership cultures.

A further consideration warranting attention for external partners in reform campaigns is the influence of cultural and security contexts on marginalized groups’ preferred change strategies. For example, soft advocacy in Cambodia—adopted at times for security considerations—won’t work in Somaliland, where direct action is likely to be preferred, while in south-east Nigeria, ‘belly politics’, as the preferred political change currency, means that political and economic coercion are seen as more effective than other change strategies.

Another lesson emerging from the case studies, one that is often forgotten in the intensity of reform campaigns, is that change is most often long-term in nature, therefore requiring changing education curricula for children and young people to integrate human rights principles, particularly those
promoting respect for and tolerance of difference. Linked to this is the importance of overcoming patriarchy and deference in developing young people’s self-confidence and reconstructing political and other institutions to encourage young people’s participation in political discourse. This includes considering, for example, introducing quotas for young people to increase their participation in parliaments and other representative bodies.

The case studies also yield more specific lessons and recommendations on effective inclusion reform strategies. They illustrate the importance of research underpinning advocacy, including case study research as an effective way of expressing, in marginalized group members’ own terms, the experiences informing their advocacy messages. Importantly, researchers should avoid the pitfalls of needs research and understand that marginalized groups are rarely homogeneous and often include multiple subgroups. Similarly, it is important to use intersecting characteristics of subgroup members (e.g. gender and ethnicity) to overcome conflict or tension within marginalized groups.

The public profiles that reform campaigners adopt, including their perceived motives and transparency, the language they use in their negotiations, the timing of their campaigns and the advantages of campaigns coinciding with other national, international or even local reform events have been noted as critical factors that can determine the success of reform endeavours.

The case studies also provide a number of lessons for external democracy cooperation partners working with marginalized groups, among them the importance of understanding local cultures, institutions and ways of doing things. Marginalized group members most often have the answers to their own issues—they simply require exposure to advocacy strategies, tactics and methods drawing on lessons provided by activists in other polities, such as those articulated throughout this publication. When confronted with dominant group practices that exclude marginalized people, it is crucial to search for the cultural values underpinning dominant group practices or behaviours and find alignment between these values and the human rights principles that reform strategies are based on.

Lastly, when considering electoral systems and procedures supporting marginalized groups’ entry into parliaments, assessing the circumstances under which quotas and reserved seat allocations advantage marginalized groups is vital. To assist marginalized groups in gaining access to elected positions in representative forums—including, importantly, lower houses of parliament—it may be necessary for members of these groups to monitor political parties and traditional power brokers’ gate-keeping practices and candidate financing.
Introduction
Introduction

Purpose and structure

The purpose of this publication is to describe strategies successfully deployed by marginalized groups and others, including governments, in the Global South, seeking to overcome barriers excluding marginalized groups from political decision-making, whether in democratic or customary governance; and to make recommendations for policymakers and other reform stakeholders on the methods that are most likely to facilitate marginalized groups’ inclusion in such decision-making. International IDEA has chosen to identify lessons from the Global South because, as mentioned in the literature review, very little has been written on inclusion successes and part-successes in the Global South and how these can translate to lessons for democracy cooperation practitioners in either the Global South or North.

The strategies discussed in this publication are based on research conducted by International IDEA between September 2011 and March 2012. The research was commissioned from 43 researchers providing 38 case studies on marginalized groups ranging from religiously and ethnically excluded women to young people, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, linguistically excluded groups and those facing discrimination based on their sexual orientation.

International IDEA has prioritized political participation and representation as one of four key impact areas in its work, making the inclusion of marginalized groups in political processes in conventional democratic or customary governance systems an important theme for this key impact area.\(^1\) Overlaying these four key impact areas are International IDEA’s three cross-cutting themes: gender and women’s empowerment, conflict and security, and democracy and diversity. Since 2011, the Institute’s democracy and diversity programme has developed a knowledge base to help improve the capacities of democratic and customary governance structures to manage and accommodate diversity. The case studies referred to in this publication
provide insightful examples of success in managing diversity and overcoming political exclusion.

Substantial evidence exists pointing to the exclusion of marginalized and minority groups from political decision-making as a key factor in both political and civil conflict and instability (Baldwin, Chapman and Gray 2007). Recent conflicts in Chechnya, north-west China, Darfur, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, the occupied Palestinian Territories, Sri Lanka and Turkey have involved marginalized peoples’ rights to recognition and participation being ignored or confounded.

However, improving opportunities for previously marginalized or minority groups to participate in democratic institutions and processes has often had a conflict-prevention effect, be it through constitutional and electoral system reform or genuine participation in political parties and justice systems. Providing space for minority groups to express and indeed celebrate their identities has been crucial in peace-building processes, as exemplified by minority group engagement in post-apartheid South Africa’s constitutional and electoral system reform, allowing South Africa’s multiple ethnic, social and linguistic groups to enjoy a more representative level of participation in democratic politics (Baldwin et al. 2007).

This introduction presents a literature review and a description of the research methodology used in International IDEA’s inclusion studies. The 38 case studies reviewed yielded a number of strategic lessons and implications for those engaged in democracy cooperation and reform. These lessons are presented in the following five sections, each of which concludes with a list of specific recommendations for policy analysts and inclusion stakeholders.

The analysis and recommendations flow largely from the case studies but also from the outcomes of an International IDEA workshop with inclusion practitioners from the Global South held in Kathmandu, Nepal in September 2012. The workshop identified and documented the challenges confronting a diverse range of marginalized groups and how these groups have succeeded in moving from political exclusion to inclusion—or have made some progress in doing so—in customary and conventional governance settings.

By providing examples of marginalized groups successfully overcoming barriers to their participation in decision-making, International IDEA hopes that decision-makers—including legislators and policymakers, paramount or village chiefs and civil society stakeholders—will be convinced of the benefits of deepening democracy through meaningful decision-making participation.
Literature review

The academic literature on inclusion processes in both formal and customary decision-making settings, particularly studies looking at South-East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, is informed predominately by its focus on social movements and positive action. More specifically, studies examining strategies used to further marginalized groups’ political inclusion are often conducted in the context of social movements and community organizing or mobilizing models and campaigns, or through research on affirmative action measures and constitutional provisions.

There is also a third area of non-academic research commissioned by non-state institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and local civil society organizations on the exclusion–inclusion theme. Such research often adopts a rights-based perspective. Each of these three areas is reviewed below.

Social movements

Social movement studies span several areas of research including sociology, political science, law, gender studies and queer studies. This area also includes research on identity construction, movement mobilization and organizing (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Discussions around what constitutes a community and the differences between community organizing and mobilizing together with indigenous and exogenous change processes are frequent (Fawcett 1999; Payne 1995). Rothman (2001) has developed a framework for understanding the strategies and actions adopted by communities engaged in change work, based on existing or new power centres and top-down or bottom-up change approaches.

In contrast, Polletta and Jasper argue that the strategies used by social movements or communities cannot solely be analysed according to this logic, as a group’s identity will influence its choice of strategies.

Social movement theorists have sought to understand actions by social movements including differences in both the dialogue and subsequent activities that nevertheless encourage solidarity and commonality. For example, Hewitt (2011) differentiates between oppositional, rights-based and internally focused models, identifying internally focused models as being more effective for overcoming intra-movement differences and fostering a sense of commonality. Internally focused models are also the most successful in fostering a shared sense of struggle by building on inherent differences while not expecting the movement to monolithically apply strategies across the board. In contrast, the other two models, although also acknowledging
diversity, nevertheless have the potential to heighten disagreements and contentions within movements due to their focus on a particular area and/or hierarchy of issue, potentially leading to their sometimes unintentional silencing of marginal voices within a movement.

The literature on social movements provides a useful lens for analysing the reasoning behind collective action, and a theoretical framework for interpreting strategies chosen. It is, however, largely focused on social movements and community organizing in Western countries and fails to detail specific steps taken by marginalized groups to reach inclusion in other parts of the world.

**Positive action**

Similarly, studies on positive action do not detail how marginalized groups have empowered themselves to utilize affirmative action measures to further their inclusion in political decision-making. Instead, they focus on either technical details or the ideological justifications underpinning the implementation of such measures. Such literature predominantly refers to issues of gender, ethnic and religious minority equality, focusing on the design, types and implementation of quotas and other measures.

Another strand of the existing literature attempt to determine the effect of affirmative action on the numbers of marginalized group members elected to parliaments or national assemblies (Dahlerup 2006; Norris 2006). Other positive action research has focused on investigating the impact of quotas on policy outcomes (Krook 2010).

**Non-academic research**

The models developed by state agencies, civil society organizations and the UN on inclusion for marginalized groups are perhaps the most relevant literature for this publication. These models seek to provide a framework of reference on inclusion strategies used either by agencies or the groups themselves, ranging from advocating for the application of rights-based approaches (UNDP 2007) to cautioning against an over-reliance on such approaches (Laidlaw Foundation 2002). Civil society, the state and the media are generally seen as important vehicles for action (Laidlaw Foundation 2002; UNDP 2004, 2007; DFID 2005) with most studies arguing for the importance of including marginalized groups in the development of relevant change work, although Pant’s (2004) study of nomadic tribes in India’s Rajasthan State asserts that external actors can be crucial in mobilizing marginalized communities by bringing in outside skills and know-how, helping to initiate the struggle for change.
However, the models developed by non-state actors are for the most part repetitive, reflecting a limited understanding of inclusion issues and appearing to be largely centred on the importance of marginalized groups participating in change efforts and the utilization of human rights-based approaches. The literature therefore offers little new insight or alternatives to widely accepted good practices.

Both academic and non-academic studies largely fail to suggest replicable frameworks or innovative solutions for successfully including marginalized groups in political decision-making in the Global South. Significantly, the literature rarely analyses positive steps taken by marginalized groups or their advocates to reach inclusion in governance settings. Very few strategies adopted in studies covered by the literature can be replicated. As the available literature offers little additional information on good practice methodologies facilitating greater inclusion of marginalized groups in the Global South, more research is needed on the specific strategies used by marginalized groups to overcome exclusion in both formal and customary governance settings. This study represents an attempt to do just that.

**Research methodology**

International IDEA undertook a three-stage process in commissioning, reviewing and compiling its research on how historically marginalized groups have managed to overcome their exclusion from democratic and customary governance structures and processes through initiatives that have changed knowledge, understanding, attitudes and practices on the part of dominant cultures and decision-makers. International IDEA began the process by inviting researchers familiar with marginalized groups’ progression from exclusion to inclusion to submit summary papers describing their prospective case studies, including outlines of the political, cultural and socio-economic contexts within which marginalization was taking place, together with the key change processes and outcomes leading to political inclusion.

This commissioning process was completed in August 2011. From the 205 summaries received, a total of 43 authors were contracted to submit 38 case studies of up to 10,000 words in length. Most case studies were submitted in late 2011 and completed after editing processes in March 2012.

Case studies were required to follow the same basic structure, with a background section reflecting the context within which marginalized groups find themselves, including key historical, political and economic factors contributing to or explaining their exclusion; an analysis of the impact
exclusionary practices have had on such groups and on social, political and economic structures in general; and a discussion of the ways in which the exclusion of marginalized groups may benefit particular interests within social, political and economic structures.

The case studies also detailed the processes marginalized groups and other parties undertook to overcome their exclusion, including the ways in which they successfully negotiated with decision-makers to achieve inclusion outcomes. However, some cases studies identified inclusion reforms as being largely government-initiated, and these have been highlighted throughout this publication. Each of the case studies went on to outline any changes in knowledge, understanding, attitudes, practices and behaviours on the part of decision-makers and others—including, importantly, the community at large—and the critical factors underpinning such changes.

Authors employed a number of information gathering techniques, ranging from questionnaire-based surveys to interviews with key informants and, most importantly, affected marginalized group members. In many cases, authors included relevant statistical data and recent literature as well as qualitative and quantitative research covering both the marginalized groups under analysis and the issues confronting them.

Lastly, each author identified the policy implications and other lessons from their respective analyses, with some also describing the implications for other marginalized groups striving to overcome similar barriers to their inclusion in democratic and customary governance. These analyses incorporated authors’ assessments of the extent to which lessons can be replicated elsewhere and the circumstances either supporting or mitigating against replication, including any suggested modifications to change processes to make them more relevant in other contexts.
Section 1

Key macro-level factors determining inclusion
Section 1

1.1. The link between poverty and marginalization

The strong link between poverty and marginalization means that multi-dimensional interventions are required to overcome political exclusion. A frequently observed phenomenon found in both customary and non-customary governance settings is the complexity of factors causing marginalization and political exclusion, and the interconnectedness of poverty, marginalization and political exclusion. Poverty and marginalization have led to deficits in people’s livelihoods, education, health and access to other basic services, and these deficits are in turn often connected to their exclusion from political decision-making, as has been shown in many of the case studies reviewed here. Perhaps the cases most clearly articulating the link between marginalization, political exclusion and poverty are those analysing the advances made by people with disabilities in Uganda in their struggle to translate their initial experiences of political inclusion into better services and living standards for people with disabilities.

The Uganda studies by Musyoka (2012), Sajjabi (2012) and Sebuliba, Abdul and Atwijuire (2012) refer to the strong link between disability and poverty. Disabled people’s lack of employment opportunities limits their chances of extracting themselves from the poverty trap, notwithstanding some progress made in overcoming political exclusion. Sebuliba et al. refer to estimates that more than seven out of ten disabled persons in Uganda live in abject poverty with extremely low literacy rates (2012: 6). The strong link between poverty, illiteracy and political marginalization has been borne out by several other case study authors, among them Wigglesworth (2012), Standley (2012), Henry (2013) and Gollifer (2013) in their studies of women overcoming political exclusion in Timor-Leste, north-west Kenya, Myanmar and Cambodia respectively (for more information on each of these studies, refer to the boxes and elaboration in the text that follows). This theme is taken up in more detail in the context of confidence building and leadership training for marginalized groups in Section 5.
The implication for democracy reform is that interventions must be multidimensional and coordinated, involving legally binding and monitored measures such as inclusive constitutional, legislative and legal reforms. These should be complemented by income generation, literacy, community education and, quite often, physical infrastructure improvement initiatives and well-integrated basic services such as, for example, childcare, a critical provision promoting broader women’s participation. This is even more apparent in situations involving multiple or intersecting discrimination. For example, Mohan and Tabassum (2013) describe the experiences of women from religious minorities enrolled in a programme using both the Qur’an and the Indian Constitution to educate Muslim women and their communities on their political and legal rights, including rights to education, choice of marital partner, divorce, and participation in governance and enterprise. Similarly, Witmer (2012) provides an example of multi-dimensional interventions in post-apartheid South Africa’s Manenberg area, a poverty-stricken settlement where black majorities have reclaimed their rights to basic services and local decision-making in the face of gang domination, increasing crime and other challenges to law enforcement, safety and security (see Box 1.1).

Box 1.1. Forced inclusion of Manenberg residents in livelihood strategies perpetuating economic dependency and social fragmentation

‘My father was shot by one of the gangs. Once I heard of this, I rushed to my house. By the time I had arrived, the Hard Livings gang leader, Staggie, had already taken my father to the hospital. My mother had no other form of transportation and had to accept. My father died on the way to the hospital. That same day, the gang members went through the community collecting … sort of demanding … money for our family. I know that no one had money to give, and I will not have money to pay. I was so angry … and then they [the gang] came and gave us about 3,000 rand.’

‘Someone will rob my house and I will know what gang they are from. I will go to the leader of the gang and say, “one of your boys robbed me blind,” he will tell me that they have no control over the young ones and that he will help me out. A day later, my house is filled with new furniture and my fridge is full. A day later, I am told that I have credit with the gang. You see, they did tell the young one to steal from me. They are all in it together … they still buy me groceries.’

‘I had no house to live in … I was going to be kicked out … my son was a member of the gang so I got a house.’

‘The gangs used to announce that they were coming the next day. All of the people were on the streets then … waiting for them to drive by. They must have tossed out 20,000 rand in
International IDEA’s research provides several examples of multi-layered interventions combining with political developments at more than one governance level to yield positive inclusion outcomes. Ubink’s (2013) study of women’s empowerment in Namibia’s Owambo region identifies the interconnectedness of change at different governance levels and indeed the importance of working for change concurrently at the local, regional and national levels, while Solanki’s (2012) study of the progress women have made in overcoming exclusion in Baptist Church leadership and village authorities in Manipur, East India identifies the role that gender rights discourse played at the international level in creating space and impetus for change for women in church leadership positions at the regional and local levels.

Several case studies highlight the fact that unless inclusion reforms are implemented at the local, district, provincial and national levels (with some requiring international interventions as well), obstacles to exclusion may not be effectively removed. Conversely, many reforms targeting one or two levels have at times been ineffective (Ubink 2013; Bastola 2012; Sajjabi 2012; Sebuliba et al. 2012; Otto 2012). For example, the introduction of constitutional and legislative reforms in Uganda addressing discrimination and political exclusion experienced by people with disabilities has increased political participation but has not in itself significantly changed the provision of services to people with disabilities, or their quality of life. Despite the Ugandan Parliament passing several disability-specific laws and 15 other acts in which disability rights clauses have been inserted, considerable deficits remain in both political and social attitudes towards the disabled, including a lack of government investment in community education to reverse attitudes immersed in stigma (Sajjabi 2012: 17), a need for training and confidence building for disabled political representatives (Musyoka 2012: 17) and divisions across disability networks, structures and service providers (Sajjabi 2012: 31; Sebuliba et al. 2012: 28).

There are, of course, circumstances such as language barriers, distance and resourcing limitations mitigating against activists working beyond the local level. In such cases, exploring and developing alliances linking groups working at the local level with those at the national and indeed international levels is important in overcoming exclusion challenges (see Section 1.2).
The efficacy of a multi-dimensional approach in overcoming exclusion has been evident, even in cases when interventions have been focused on a single level of governance alone, such as customary governance in Kenya’s arid north-western Turkana district. Standley (2012) has shown that women’s groups developing multi-pronged strategies to assist communities in overcoming the impact of climate change (beginning with finding more productive livelihood strategies than the less productive traditional ones) have in the process addressed a range of community problems, assisting women to move to significantly greater inclusion in customary decision-making (see Box 1.2). Their contribution to family finances, while strengthening their voices in both family and community decision-making, has been a critical development and one cited elsewhere in this publication.

Constitutional and legislative reforms, together with reforms targeting political parties and other political institutions, must also be accompanied by community education initiatives promoting attitudinal change to overcome deep-seated, systemic and institutional obstacles to the inclusion of marginalized groups in decision-making. As stated in a 2011 International IDEA analysis of diversity management issues (IDEA 2011: 21), anti-minority prejudice and discrimination will never be legislated out of existence. Governments often fail to provide adequate resources for diversity education and promotion campaigns addressing minority–majority relations. Bastola notes in his analysis of caste and gender exclusion in the rural village of Wadi in India’s Maharashtra State that despite the introduction of the 1993 Panchayat Raj Act, democratic decentralization is far from complete, with the Act’s inclusion of lower castes in local government requiring a range of supplementary developmental initiatives to have any chance of success (Bastola 2012: 16).

In Burundi, some progress has been made concerning the political inclusion of the historically stigmatized and politically excluded Batwa people. This has largely resulted from advocacy and lobbying at the local, regional and national levels, as well as international advocacy aimed at holding governments in the region accountable for the Batwa’s marginalization and discrimination. However, the lack of coordinated and coherent action across all governance levels, together with the limited investment in reversing social attitudes towards the Batwa, have led to negligible progress in Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in conforming to international norms for indigenous peoples. The Batwa people—and Batwa women in particular—remain marginalized, experiencing discrimination, violence, human rights abuses, land injustice and a lack of access to basic services such as health and education (Otto 2012: 16).
International IDEA’s case studies highlight the fact that progress in one governance domain, be it national, provincial or local government, is likely to lead to progress in another, causing a domino effect, as in the Namibia and South Africa examples, described by Ubink and Heemann respectively, where events at the national level have combined with events at the regional level and within the judicial sector to create momentum for change at lower governance levels, in both cases assisting women to assume more central roles in decision-making.

Box 1.2. Women’s movement into previously inaccessible customary governance decision-making in northern Kenya

A more balanced asset base enhances flexibility in dealing with change and is reflected in one’s ability to counteract challenges associated with the loss of one type of capital (e.g. loss of human labour due to ill-health), with another (e.g. additional labour opportunities due to forming new contacts in a women’s group).

The steps [the Turkana Women have undertaken] have had significantly positive outcomes for human capital in the form of education. The testimonies of male and female elders illustrate that education is increasingly justified in Turkana society due to increasingly prolonged and severe drought and subsequent lack of livestock for the bridewealth1 exchange:

‘In the past our communities were very rich and we had many livestock ... there was no awareness ... or perceived need about education because there was no suffering’ (Male Elder, Katilu).

‘People have learnt the hard way that families who educated their children are now doing much better’ (Female Elder, Kapua).

Women’s groups supporting alternative livelihood strategies have improved access to education by making school fees more affordable. For instance, the Aloe Production Group in Namoruputh has ‘generated new money for women from the production and sale of aloe products’ [creating] ‘additional access to credit to pay school fees’ (Female Aloe Group Member, Namoruputh). In addition to improved knowledge on health and hygiene, school attendance is presenting long-term adaptive capacity benefits for women, through their ability to enter the formal job market and communicate via the written word.


1 Bridewealth is a payment in the form of money, property, or other valuable asset that is made by or on behalf of a prospective husband to the bride’s family in particular cultures and is also known as a bride price.
1.2. Collective action via networking and alliance building

Well-coordinated collective action via networking and alliance building warrants priority in strategies to overcome exclusion. While change strategies need to be locally planned and devised, another common element appearing in many of the case studies is the importance of collective action or agency in overcoming the challenges posed by long-standing and deeply entrenched ethnic, religious, gender and other divisions. Alliance building through networking and coordination of previously fragmented change campaigns forms a key element in the successes the authors describe. Strengthening civil society’s support for marginalized groups by organizing more formally into coordinated structures has been shown to significantly assist campaigns. As Lambi and Dameni indicate (2013: 354) in the context of Cameroon, no meaningful participation can occur when marginalized groups are fragmented, disorganized, informal and therefore politically weak.

When religious, ethnic, gender and other divisions have led to conflict, forging alliances with neutral parties is strategically critical in swaying adversaries to accept one’s position. In the case of the Wajir women advocating for peace in northern Kenya (Kimathi 2013: 82), placing neutral but well-respected elders in the negotiating spotlight proved pivotal to their peace-making success (see Box 1.3).

Box 1.3. Women’s strategic mobilization of neutral male leadership to lead peace building in Somaliland

After an initial failure [in approaching majority clan elders to assist with peace building], the Wajir women changed their strategy, approaching elders from the minority Kona clans, which were not directly involved in the conflicts. Traditionally, the Kona are not involved in regional power struggles as their numbers make them almost insignificant. Their elders, like any other Somali elders, are nonetheless respected across clan lines. The women requested these elders to mediate between the warring elders. After lengthy talks, the Kona elders convened a meeting of elders representing all the clans. This was a major coup for the women. They had known all along that if they continued with the peace campaign without male involvement, the community would shun their efforts. It was, therefore, critical to not only incorporate the men but to allow them take the lead (at least in public). Furthermore, it was more face-saving for the elders of the major clans to come together via the mediation of elders of the minor clans than through the intervention of women.

As expected, the first meetings were very antagonistic. Many elders resented the fact that
the peace initiative had been started by women, whom they referred to as children. The breakthrough came when one of the elders speaking in favour of the initiative stated that the elders as a group had failed in their primary responsibility to provide protection for the community. Reluctantly, the other elders—some of whom were known warlords—agreed that it was time to end the conflicts that had adversely affected all corners of Wajir (Ibrahim and Jenner 1996). In a society that privileges the opinions of men and the elderly over women and the young, this was a significant breakthrough.


An impressive example of a marginalized group overcoming political and social exclusion due to the strength of its alliances comes from Ecuador and the role the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) played in campaigning for indigenous people to achieve greater democratic inclusion. As Tromme, Hillebrandt, Rohland and Foreman note (2012), from the early 1990s CONAIE became a political change-maker and a pivotal social actor, toppling two presidents and in 1998 pushing through a new constitution for Ecuador, facilitating the state’s decentralization and the democratization of local powers together with recognition of collective rights, and in the process introducing indigenous issues into the political system and problematizing racism in the public arena. CONAIE succeeded in making the indigenous movement the most important political change agent in Ecuador from 1990 to 2002 (Gallegos 2009: 90 cited in Tromme et al. 2012: 22–3).

The key ingredients underpinning CONAIE’s successful inclusion campaign were its capacity for social mobilization (Peralta, 2011 cited in Tromme et al. 2012: 23) and the strength of its member organizations. Indeed, a former president of the Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa Nationality (Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador, ECUARUNARI), one of three regional groupings comprising the CONAIE, oversaw the signing of the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169 (Yashar, 2006 cited in Tromme et al. 2012). The Convention recognizes indigenous peoples’ cultures and identities, requiring that minorities are consulted with and able to participate in issues affecting them, including the use of hydrocarbons, an important CONAIE priority.

Iman Gurung (2012) presents a vivid example of the power of collective action leading to the election of a lower-caste candidate as village chairperson in his account of events in Sirdibas, in remote southern Nepal. This result
occurred after 25 years of manipulation by a higher caste despot, who had falsely declared to visiting election commission officials his own election as village chairperson, unopposed (see Box 1.4).

**Box 1.4. Higher caste manipulation, nepotism and lack of accountability in rural Nepal’s local governance**

Although the constitution of Nepal required village chairpersons to be elected by voters every five years, elections were not held in Sirdibas for 25 years. According to Bal Bahadur Karki, ‘no one wanted to contest in the election. It had too many responsibilities and the Gurungs did not want to take those responsibilities’.

In contrast, when asked, the Gurung villagers recalled that ‘nobody dared to contest because whoever challenged Karki, never had happy life’. Every five years when the Government sent the election commission officials, Karki stopped them in Jagat and told them that he was the sole candidate and hence was to be declared as the elected Chairman. The Gurung community, however, were never aware of the arrivals of election commissioners and pending elections. They were told by Karki that the Government had yet again appointed him as Chairman. Every five years when he declared himself as the Chairman as a reward for his excellent service, Karki singlehandedly appointed his relatives and supporters for the posts of Vice Chairman and Heads of each village in the Village Development Committee, the posts which required selection through open elections. Thus, Gurung villagers were never allowed to exercise their legitimate political rights.


The importance of networking and building strategic alliances also emerges in a case study providing a very different focus. In analysing the challenges of reconstructing formerly distorted historical records, Hille, Gendron and Goos document the difficulties facing the Circassians in recovering their own historical narrative and cultural identity, including difficulties in achieving effective political collaboration owing to their geographic dispersal within Russia, and their sizeable diaspora (2012: 13).

It was only shortly before the collapse of the former Soviet Union that serious efforts to coordinate the different Circassian communities emerged. Since then, several factors have improved collaboration between Circassian communities including faster, more cost-effective and reliable communication, fewer travel restrictions within Russia and, importantly, the 1989 founding of the International Circassian Association (ICA) involving the diaspora in
building important alliances and promoting work on a cultural manifestation of Circassian history. These developments, together with the advent of social media, have led to the Circassian issue gaining greater traction on the international stage and more recently being perceived as a ‘real’ issue by the United States Government, which is now liaising with the Georgian authorities on the Circassian genocide and history (Hille et al. 2012: 13).

As the Circassian case demonstrates, extending networks of activists is an important process in developing a critical membership mass to overcome political exclusion. Hedström’s case study of Myanmar’s Burmese Women’s Union (BWU) notes that recruiting women previously reluctant to become involved in reform efforts using non-political spaces and informal meeting venues, such as libraries for migrants and drop-in centres for domestic violence survivors, enabled women to meet and relate to one another across ethnic differences without an overt political agenda (2013: 256). Using these non-political settings and community events such as prayer ceremonies, healing workshops and festivals has been effective in building trust and understanding among people of different religious and ethnic identities, as also noted by Mohan and Tabassum (2013: 264).

These strategies have provided marginalized groups with access to a wider network of potential reform supporters and opportunities for incrementally introducing political topics. People receiving such information share their increased knowledge with other community members, multiplying the information-dissemination impact, an essential first step in recruiting new reform campaign participants.

As referred to above, networking and alliance building with groups such as young people experiencing similar exclusion issues is often a highly productive strategy, contributing additional human resources and, importantly, enthusiasm, energy and political weight to reform initiatives. Unions have also been shown to play a critical role in alliance building and in facilitating political change, as noted by Diala (2012: 16) in his Nigeria case study. In Nigeria’s Owerri province, town unions—self-help groups promoting the development of their members’ townships—played a major role in helping the Osu people successfully overcome traditional obstacles to their participation in customary governance.

Lastly, alliance building, cooperation and coordination with governments have been shown in several case studies to be particularly helpful in reforming exclusion practices. As de Wijn asserts (2012: 14), while affirmative action may be an important step towards developing an inclusive environment, inclusion alone does not automatically lead to empowerment. The overall aim
should be to mainstream inclusion and foster broad-based participation, and government cooperation, although often missing, can facilitate the process.

1.3. Cultural and security contexts

Change strategies are often determined by cultural and security contexts. Strategies designed to facilitate changes in knowledge, attitudes, practices and ultimately behaviours towards marginalized groups must be consistent with a country’s cultural context and its socio-political and security environment. For example, women’s political activism in Cambodia will not necessarily reflect the confrontational approaches women have used successfully in Somaliland. For Cambodian women, anxieties flowing from the country’s recent history of governing through intimidation and fear, via the central political parties’ rigid control of local council politics, reflect their own and their families’ security as important factors determining their use of very non-confrontational approaches in dealing with gendered attitudes. The importance of activists undertaking ongoing context- and risk-analyses in politically and militarily insecure environments, together with crisis management preparation to deal with potential threats when undertaking change work, also comprised a key recommendation from a 2012 International IDEA workshop on inclusion strategies for change activists (International IDEA 2012). Minority Rights Group International has come across numerous cases of intimidation, leading minority activists to withdraw from making public statements about governments or other entities, or re-writing statements to praise regimes. When dealing with both national and particularly international exposure, the risks involved for marginalized people need to be considered and strategies devised for minimizing or eliminating them.

In contrast to the Cambodia example, women in Somaliland have emboldened themselves to be collectively confrontational after experiencing several direct-action protest successes. The lesson here is that democracy reform work must be cognizant of the fact that in each socio-political culture and, indeed, subculture, the array of strategies to facilitate change is best identified and adopted by marginalized groups from within those cultural and security contexts. This is supported by an additional recurring lesson evident in many of the case studies: unlike home-grown solutions, externally imposed solutions most often don’t work.

Diala asserts that in Nigeria’s ‘belly politics’ culture—a culture not overly fond of resolving political disputes through dialogue (see Box 1.5)—the change strategies that work most effectively involve political and economic coercion. Specifically, in south-east Nigeria’s Igboland, Diala notes that the dominant group’s willingness and ability to unlearn cultural stereotypes and
engage with the historically excluded Osu ethnic minority on an equal basis were influenced more by town unions’ ‘coercive’ economic pressure than by political dialogue (Diala 2012: 25). This example supports the proposition that we should never assume that a particular approach to conflict management and resolution in the political realm such as principled negotiation and dialogue will always succeed in matching the cultural context, and that studies and their associated theories reflecting cultural dimensions of political conflict such as Hoefstede’s (2010) warrant close attention and application when considering inclusion reform strategies.

Box 1.5. Belly politics in south-east Nigeria

Having realized the failure of legislation to end discrimination against Osu people, the branches of town unions … successfully utilized economic coercion to aid the integration of Osu people into customary governance processes. At general town meetings, Osu people employed lobbying and coercion to woo opinion towards their full participation in customary governance (Owuamanam 2011). Sometimes using financial inducements, they convinced willing Ezes to invest them with chieftaincy titles, which enabled them to become members of the Eze’s Council. This strategy of economic coercion, which in practice is referred to as politics of the stomach, or ‘belly politics’ (Bayart 1994), was largely successful because of the high rate of poverty in Igboland. Besides belly politics, many Osu persons who took advantage of Western education used their learning to occupy several leading positions in the national and regional government. From these positions, they utilized their influential roles in town unions to push for the integration of Osu people into customary governance.

From Diala, A. C., *Case Study of the Osu People in Owerri, South-East Nigeria* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2012) unpublished, p. 20

1.4. Educating young people about girls’ and women’s inclusion

Educating young people about the importance of girls’ and women’s inclusion and facilitating their participation in political discourse are crucial longer-term strategies. Several case study authors highlight the fact that there are no shortcuts in the task of overcoming obstacles to marginalized groups’ social and political exclusion. This means that integrating citizenship and human rights principles such as marginalized people’s equality into formal and non-formal education curricula will produce positive changes in community knowledge, attitudes and behaviours and will considerably advance marginalized people’s empowerment in the longer term.
Investing in girls’ education—for example, in the Muslim context, by working with Islamic religious scholars to secure future attitudinal changes towards women’s and girls’ empowerment—has been seen as a critical success factor in reform, as women themselves are often opposed to reforming women’s rights. Basing education on the Qur’an as well as on national and, where appropriate, international legal protections, has been instrumental in the successes reported here, for example in Mohan and Tabassum’s West India study (2013: 230). Promoting the principle of political participation via education curricula as a fundamental entitlement—as found in many national constitutions—also leads to political parties and other political institutions adopting gender policies and other inclusion policies and action plans as templates for change. Increasing young people’s active engagement with politics through their genuine—as opposed to superficial—involvement in public budgeting processes (Maita 2012), or youth networks aligning themselves with women’s organizations in peace building processes (Kimathi 2013: 81), also demonstrate the importance of facilitating longer-term inclusive policy change (see Box 1.6).

**Box 1.6. Young people’s participation in public budgeting processes in Embakasi, Kenya**

Initially most of the youth groups in Embakasi were created by state agencies or civil society organizations as mere community structures for the disbursement of donor grants or government driven programs … depending on materialistic tokenism [or] political patronage, [but in reality increasing] youth marginalization. The few vibrant youth advocacy organizations ended up being perceived as a threat to the political establishment and were targeted for intimidation.

Young people were then recruited and financed to promote ethnic tensions and violence during the election period or as gangs to protect politicians’ economic interests such as land. As the youth became drunk with false power in the midst of poverty and hopelessness, some government fund managers went to bed with public money, diverting resources [intended] for education, job creation, reproductive health, ICT development, sports and other basic services for youth.

Breaking the chains of marginalization proved to be a journey riddled with many ups and downs … the challenge was how to motivate [diverse groups of young people] to unite and take action. The second challenge was how to reconcile the historical tensions and social and political differences characterizing youth relations in Embakasi. The third hurdle was that historically youth used to come together only when they were being given handouts … to participate in any process. In … Jipange … ‘volunteerism, self-help and youth acting together’ was the only form of motivation [youth] leaders could provide. The fourth
impediment was how to organize youth [and avoid the] impression that the initiative’s primary agenda is to oust the area’s current political leadership. While political participation by youth is a constitutional right, the initial process required deferring this aspiration until young people could establish a strong constituency and political muscle to act. The fifth challenge was how to manage the process in a way that will not raise expectations among youth or create leadership wrangles and infighting at the expense of the bigger goal of [overcoming] youth marginalization…[After resolving these challenges] youth leaders were able to proceed with the initiative via the following steps:

1) After its establishment, Jipange Youth Organization approached Plan International Kenya, the latter undertaking a training needs assessment and trainings in the National Youth Policy 2005, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, the Children’s Act 2001, devolved funds, advocacy, leadership, social budgeting and social auditing.

2) Establishing Youth committees with specific terms of reference on how to undertake the process of engagement [with devolved funds management committees]

3) With support by Plan Kenya and some government departments, the youth establishing various engagement tools e.g. a citizen score card for social audits, a citizen transparency board, an e-governance centre and some thematic brochures.

4) Power mapping and analysis—the nature and type of interests and influence various Embakasi actors have was identified and approaches for engaging them put in place.

5) Identifying and engaging stakeholders on how they would support youth participation.

6) Identifying various information sources, targeting them for secondary data review and the gathering of evidence which was key in their advocacy efforts.

Armed with knowledge and skills, the youth collected views from the public targeting diverse interest groups, prepared and circulated a schedule of public consultations on youth priorities in Embakasi and established four sector-specific committees to spearhead the process. They used word of mouth, posters, local FM radio stations, emails and social media such as Twitter and Facebook to communicate their message. They also held focus group discussions, conducted interviews and reviewed secondary data from relevant government departments. The youth prioritized and validated issues from their peers and submitted the budget proposals to the government. They were then provided with feedback, although they protested against some unfunded budget items and demanded representation in the ‘powerful’ District Development Committee (DDC) which they were later granted. They later formed a limited company whose shareholding [comprises] young people with varied experience in vocational work.

Young people’s participation in political discourse was prioritized by the Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding in its 2007 Civil Paths to Peace report, noting the importance of promoting respect and understanding in an inter-generational context. The report recommends overcoming societal norms such as patriarchy and deference in developing young people’s self-confidence, while reforming authority structures to encourage young people to participate in political discourse. This, the report notes, is particularly important for young women and other groups whose voices are ‘normally stilled through a reference to “tradition” or “custom”’ (2007: 60). The report goes on to state that when young people are disenfranchised, humiliated or made to feel that they have little say and no future, they may become drawn into movements or ideologies appearing to guarantee them a place in the world and give them a solid identity, including the possibility that they will be enlisted by inspiring or forceful leaders into conflicts as combatants (2007: 60). The report recommends that young people should instead be seen as being at the ‘heart of the solution’ in finding civil paths to peace, as has been evident in initiatives such as various youth parliaments (2007: 62).

However, while youth parliaments are sometimes seen as a solution to managing youth participation, they seldom cater for marginalized sub-groups and often provide too little input into political decision-making. The 2010 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Standing Committee on Democracy and Human Rights only briefly referred to youth parliaments via one of 39 recommendations on how to best facilitate young people’s meaningful participation in decision-making. However, the Standing Committee’s recommendations outline many complementary approaches to promoting young people’s participation in political discourse. These include calling on states to make instruction in democracy an integral part of the compulsory school curriculum. Importantly, the IPU also recommended that parliaments mainstream youth issues in their work, for example, by using information and communications technologies (ICTs) to promote young people awareness of and participation in the political process—including through political parties. In this way, parliaments can reach out to young people and increase access to information on the democratic process, and develop practical measures such as the possible introduction of quotas for young people to increase their participation in parliament and other representative bodies (IPU 2010: 2, 12, 13, 19 and 30). These warrant serious consideration when assessing the best processes for facilitating young people’s participation in political discourse.

While the Commonwealth Commission’s report rightly prioritizes education for young people to dismantle stereotypes and value respect for diversity, this
strategy should be extended to the pre-school and primary education levels, as children at these levels are in the process of beginning their appreciation of diversity and values such as inclusion. As Fearon and Mearns (2012: 141) have shown, children are affected by community divisions around them from the age of three onwards, and their exposure to effective educational initiatives can lead them to adopting inclusive behaviour that is respectful of others and accepting of difference.
Recommendations

1. That all segments of a marginalized group are involved in designing inclusion strategies, including identifying needs and rights deficiencies, deciding jointly on common objectives, agreeing on ways forward and monitoring progress on the extent to which their objectives are met. Close consultation between activists/civil society organizations and the wider affected community should be ongoing, with reporting to and feedback from the affected community conducted throughout the change process. Importantly, both women and other marginalized groups in the affected community should be engaged in steering the process and information must be provided in a manner and through channels that are relevant to the whole marginalized community. This includes information conveyed in their own language and via processes that effectively communicate to those lacking literacy.

2. That programmes designed to reduce marginalization and overcome the political exclusion of marginalized groups adopt a comprehensive, multi-tiered approach addressing constitutional and legislative rights gaps, poverty and illiteracy through education interventions connected to livelihoods and other poverty alleviating initiatives, and confidence-building political leadership training for marginalized group members.

3. That these initiatives also address the dominant culture’s preparedness to accept and indeed celebrate marginalized groups’ contributions. This should be done though community education programmes reversing stigmatization, discrimination, exploitation and political exclusion. Those community education programmes known to be most effective across many Global South contexts have used media such as community theatre, radio, film and, most importantly, combinations of these.

4. That multi-tiered reform interventions be linked, where appropriate, to constitutional and legislative reform and diversity education campaigns addressing minority-majority relations. These multi-tiered responses should target, if necessary, each level of governance and identify options appealing to both dominant and marginalized groups to offset the possibility that dominant groups seek other means of maintaining political control through informal and/or parallel power structures.

5. That stakeholders embarking upon or involved in inclusion reform campaigns take steps, when required, to promote coordination and prevent fragmentation by building new and/or strengthening existing alliances involving three processes. First, assess the feasibility and strategies
required to recruit new members by using, if necessary, non-political spaces to raise potential members’ awareness of the issues warranting action. Second, where appropriate, build relationships with organizations able to provide assistance in developing and refining advocacy campaigns and specifically strategies and tactics generating broader public support for marginalized group inclusion in political decision-making. Third, cultivate relationships with opinion influencers such as key political and religious leaders and media representatives to build momentum for change in leadership culture towards marginalized groups.
Section 2

Political, religious, judicial and administrative determinants of inclusion
2.1. The role of political and religious leaders

Political and religious leaders play an important role in overcoming marginalized groups’ exclusion. Many of the case studies reviewed here cite political and/or religious leadership as crucial factors in supporting and in some cases actively promoting marginalized groups’ inclusion in decision-making structures and processes. Case studies from Melanesia (Johnstone 2013), Kenya (Kimathi 2013), Myanmar (Henry 2013), West India (Mohan and Tabassum 2013) and South Korea (Kim 2012) provide clear examples of the importance of this. Furthermore, in Ubink’s Namibia case study (2013) many male leaders moved to accommodate greater women’s participation after identifying the mutual gains involved, including the value to the broader community they represented as well as their value to women’s interests (see Box 2.1).

Box 2.1. A traditional chief’s support for women’s inclusion in customary decision-making, Namibia

… Chief Iipumbu himself was a main actor in encouraging the inclusion of women in traditional judicial and political decision-making structures. He often supported women’s leadership at meetings, and appointed women leaders at various levels of traditional leadership. In addition, he welcomed to Uukwambi some of his councillors and enrolled himself in a training programme for improving the administration of justice in customary courts and traditional rule, which had a strong emphasis on gender relations (Becker 1996). The gender mainstreaming of traditional institutions of judicial and political decision-making is particularly salient, considering the soaring percentage of women-headed households due to high out-migration of men. It has been suggested that another reason for Chief Iipumbu’s support for the wishes of the Uukwambi people may be found in his efforts to silence any interest in revitalizing the Uukwambi royal house, as the Chief is not a legitimate successor to the Uukwambi throne.
A key factor underpinning male leaders’ support for women’s political empowerment in customary governance that is also relevant to democratic governance is the extent to which inclusion issues are anchored in local cultures, values and discourses. The Bougainville, Kenya, Myanmar Karen, Somaliland and West India case studies provide very clear examples of the importance of such anchoring.

However, when inclusion strategies depend upon political leadership alone—particularly in the context of male chiefs representing traditionally gendered power structures—reforms can easily be compromised and short-term in nature, with male dominated structures often returning after short reform periods or creating their own informal structures and processes with which to maintain control. An example of this appears to be evolving in Afghanistan where, in spite of the Afghan Government’s commitments to international conventions and its support in implementing the National Solidarity Programme (a programme based on equal opportunities for women and men in elections for Community Development Councils and participation in councils’ decisions over local community development projects), traditional gendered power structures appear to have maintained control over these processes.

Men’s active engagement in Muslim women’s empowerment programmes is particularly critical and, in the case of the Muslim Women’s Initiative (MWI), men’s engagement was achieved when implementing agencies emphasized the important role men play in protecting their daughters, sisters, mothers and wives’ rights and well-being. This case demonstrates that in communities where men have previously been reluctant to actively provide support, reform efforts anchored in local values and customary structures are likely to overcome traditional resistance (see Box 2.2). For Muslim women attempting to address issues of inequality and empower themselves to attain parity with men, negotiating support from both male leaders and other men in the community has in several case studies been a prerequisite for generating broader support for women’s inclusion in political institutions. A further example emerged in Egypt, where AbouZeid notes (2012) that Muslim women preachers were able to persuade their husbands and mosque leaders that they had important roles to play, both as women preachers practicing in mosques—something that previously had not been tolerated—and in collaborating with their
male counterparts in urging people to return to aspects of life as laid down by the Prophet during times when state institutions, including the justice system, could not be trusted to administer the state in just and equitable ways (AbouZeid 2012: 7). This persuasion came via the women preachers’ ability to communicate with religious leaders using religious discourse, and their ability to bring many more women, children and families to the mosque by organizing community support in and around mosques for the benefit of poorer families unable to access such support from the state.

### Box 2.2. Increasing Muslim men’s participation in raising awareness about women’s rights in India

Workshops for men and boys were always held separately from those attended by women and girls. Most participants were the brothers, sons, husbands or fathers of the women who attended women’s workshops. Initially it was difficult to convince men to attend, as they felt this kind of ‘awareness-raising’ programme was only for women. This was a key challenge for the Muslim Women’s Initiative (MWI) as the involvement of men in the programme was critical to correct misperceptions or prejudices regarding women’s rights and to secure their support for and ownership of the empowerment programme overall. Local partner organizations countered this perception by emphasizing the important role men played in protecting the rights and well-being of their daughters, sisters, mothers and wives. In the end, the workshops attracted far greater interest from and participation of men than expected, and all partners had to conduct additional workshops.


Another conclusion from the case studies is that while male leaders’ support is very important in generating broader support for women’s inclusion on the part of communities and their political institutions, depending on cultural and security contexts it may not be essential to achieve this at the starting point of an inclusion campaign. The Burmese Women’s Union (BWU) case study provides an excellent model for identifying gender-conscious men to facilitate gender-awareness mainstreaming within exiled organizations. This identification was achieved by identifying male-dominated organizations, alliances and media groups that could provide young BWU women with internship opportunities and work placements, thus enabling the BWU to influence male-dominated institutions from within.
It is important to note that while campaigns to overcome marginalized groups’ exclusion are often led by marginalized groups themselves, at times in partnership with other key allies, the case studies provide several examples of governments and ministries (in Uganda, Cameroon, South Korea and South Sudan) leading processes that succeed in overcoming political and social exclusion. One example of a government adopting a proactive approach to overcoming historical exclusion is the Ugandan Government’s work in addressing the Karamojong people’s political exclusion. Ochieng describes the Ugandan Government’s work with Karamojong leaders from 2003 onwards in implementing political, economic, disarmament and development programmes. These programmes included affirmative action and basic service provision, together with political representation, all of which appears to have succeeded in helping the Karamojong overcome exclusion dating back to their initial eviction from their lands during the colonial period (Ochieng 2012: 8).

A final example of political leadership through constitutional design influencing inclusion measures emerges from South Sudan. While expectations after the July 2011 declaration of South Sudan’s independence were that northern Sudanese traders based in the South Sudanese capital, Juba, would face discrimination and political exclusion, the opposite appears to have taken place, with northern traders being treated as one of many minorities in South Sudan. In fact, according to South Sudan’s new constitution, rather than being socially and politically excluded, these traders are even eligible to become president.3 Ironically, according to Nijzink (2012), northerners are now more comfortable with their recently reduced status, for reasons outlined in Box 2.3.

**Box 2.3. Political inclusion of northern Sudanese traders in South Sudan**

Since South Sudan gained independence, northerners—and Arab Muslims in particular—feel generally more at ease in the south than they did before independence. And that’s a paradox: northerners are more comfortable now despite the fact that they have a lower status in society than they did when they were part of the dominant group in (South) Sudan.

Northerners say that southerners are less hostile towards them. Southerners now even say ‘welcome in my country’, according to Sallah Abdullah, a Sudanese technician working for an international company in South Sudan, who also knows the reason for this change in attitude: ‘they have more confidence. It’s easier to welcome people if you don’t fear oppression or domination.’

Hafis, an Arab-Muslim trader from Khartoum, explains this changing southern attitude by saying that ‘after independence, the hatred has gone, southerners feel more secure now.'
They have their own country, with their own government and with their own laws. Also the media is fulminating less towards northerners. Terms like “oppression” and “colonization” are less frequently used these days. The general feeling among southerners is that northerners in the south have lost their power to do harm. And a man who does not fear his neighbour can be more open and welcoming than someone who is afraid.


2.2. The role of the judiciary and human rights institutions

The judiciary and human rights institutions play an important role in decisions upholding inclusive constitutional provisions or international conventions and protocols. As with political and religious leaders, the judiciary plays a crucial role in overcoming exclusion. For example, in South Africa courts proved to be a critical mechanism for protecting women’s rights when these rights were challenged by customary local government. Prior to the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, South African women were barred from land ownership in their own right, and this particularly affected women without male children, who were disadvantaged by the inheritance rights of firstborn sons (male primogeniture), or the male relative’s right to inherit land and other property from the deceased household head. In chiefdom terms, this amounted to the eldest son, rather than the eldest daughter, succeeding a chief. The adoption of a new post-apartheid constitution prescribing gender equality, followed by a number of pivotal Constitutional Court rulings granting women access to land, produced a climate of change working to transform the attitudes of traditional leaders and their councils towards women.

Kimathi’s case study (2012) analyses the challenges faced by Kenya’s forcibly displaced Endorois community and provides further insights into the importance of judicial intervention, this time at the international level. The case study also reveals some of the limitations of such intervention. The Endorois community traditionally lived around Lake Bogoria and in the Mchongoi Forest areas of the Laikipia plains in Kenya’s Rift Valley. In 1973 the Kenyan Government forcefully evicted the Endorois from their ancestral lands to establish the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve. As agro-pastoralists, the Endorois’ most important source of livelihood and identity was collectively held land, including its role as a sacred site for religious and cultural rituals. Their forceful eviction led to loss of livelihood, culture and religion and in 2003, after unsuccessfully seeking redress through political bargaining and
via Kenya’s domestic jurisprudence, the community turned to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights for justice.

In an unprecedented ruling, the Commission found the Kenyan Government to be in violation of several articles of the African Charter. It made several recommendations, including the restitution of the Endorois’ ancestral land and payment of compensation for all losses suffered. While, as Kimathi (2012: 3) notes, the government is yet to comply with this decision, it has generated some changes at the local level, with the Baringo and Koibatek local authorities granting the Endorois community limited access to the reserve, thus enabling community members to perform religious and cultural rites on Lake Bogoria’s shores. Importantly, the case has focused the attention of both the Endorois and regional observers on the issue of indigenous people’s rights to land, livelihoods and cultural preservation. Seen as a precedent, the case has led to similar action being taken by other indigenous African groups losing ancestral land through government acquisition, including the Maasai of Tanzania and the Batwa of Rwanda (Kimathi 2012: 20).

At the international level, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, the UN Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous People have been monitoring the Endorois case and its implementation status. The case has also motivated the African Peer Review Mechanism to pronounce broad policy recommendations on the question of minority rights (Singoei 2011: 27 cited in Kimathi 2012: 20). These institutions are playing a crucial role in maintaining pressure on a government appearing to be unwilling to implement the Commission’s ruling, highlighting the strategic value of utilizing human rights institutions at the international and UN levels to name and shame governments guilty of creating or condoning such injustices.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s involvement in the Endorois’ case provides another example of an institution adding considerable weight to the inclusion–exclusion discourse by focusing the international spotlight on exclusion issues within and across countries. Institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures⁴ can constitute a major ally for marginalized groups in their reform campaigns.

Special Rapporteurs, working within the scope of Special Procedures mechanisms, ensure high visibility for particular rights issues. Crucially, considerable mileage can be gained by presenting submissions to Special Rapporteurs who, consider human rights abuses irrespective of the groups affected, particularly if their focus is country-specific.
The UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process and the UN Human Rights Council constitute two additional human rights facilities providing important potential support to marginalized groups and their partners. The UPR can be used to pressure states to account for discriminatory laws and practices by, for example, civil society organizations presenting shadow reports to UPR hearings. These hearings can provide such organizations with strategic opportunities to develop partnerships with governments to address exclusion practices. Governments at times struggle during UPR hearings to find solutions to the exclusion practices presented by civil society organizations and sometimes look to the latter to assist them in finding solutions to issues identified in the hearings.

The UN’s Human Rights Council can be asked by UN member states to develop specific reports on human rights gaps as a way of raising other member states’ awareness and generating and applying media pressure on recalcitrant states. Specifically, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be used as the core instrument with which to advance debate in the UN and other forums. While the UN Human Rights Council provides another vehicle for highlighting issues adversely affecting marginalized groups, there have been cases of intimidation of civil society activists by government delegations (for example, involving Sri Lanka in 2012) at the Human Rights Council and other similar events, raising the importance of considering security issues prior to undertaking campaigns via forums where anonymity cannot be guaranteed (see Section 1.3).

Two additional forums warranting mention here are the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, one of three UN bodies dealing with indigenous issues, and the UN Forum on Minority Issues. The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is an advisory body to the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues related to economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, health and human rights, providing advice and raising awareness on indigenous issues and meeting annually in New York. The Forum’s sessions are open to NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, indigenous peoples’ organizations and academic institutions. In contrast, the Forum on Minority Issues is open to non-ECOSOC accredited civil society organizations, providing a platform promoting dialogue on issues concerning national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and thematic contributions to the work of the independent expert on minority issues. The Forum focuses on thematic discussions and also meets annually.

An additional point worth noting here is that a great deal of UN-level advocacy requires considerable preparation, training and support. For example, the
UPR shadow reporting process requires submissions up to six months prior to a UPR session. Notwithstanding this, organizations such as Minority Rights Group International and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) support activists in preparing for events like UPRs and other human rights reporting processes.

Two examples of the crucial role judicial leadership has played in highlighting discriminatory practices against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex (LGBTI) groups can be found in judicial cases in Nepal and the Philippines. In 2007 the Nepal Supreme Court decided to include a third gender in citizenship provisions and allow same-sex marriage, and in doing so defined all gender minorities as ‘natural persons’ with the right to marry.

In the Philippines case, Cuyco (2012: 2) describes how LGBTI activists formed a political party, known as Ladlad, to contest the 2010 national elections as part of a strategy to fight systemic marginalization based on religious condemnation for non-conformity with church-sanctioned gender and sexual norms. Religious prejudice against homosexuality, exacerbated by unfavourable media images of LGBTI people, resulted in stigma pervading homes, schools, workplaces, public utilities and other social institutions. Once Ladlad was formed, it applied for accreditation in the Philippines’ party-list system. When the Election Commission denied Ladlad’s application on religious and moral grounds, Ladlad appealed to the Supreme Court. The court decided to reverse the Election Commission’s decision, ruling that LGBTI people should be treated like other marginalized groups and be allowed to participate in the party-list election. Although Ladlad failed to gain a seat in the post-2010 election Congress, the Supreme Court decision inspired the LGBTI community, strengthening its resolve to gain seats in the next election.

While challenging discriminatory practices on constitutional grounds is not always supported by the courts, actions by human rights institutions highlight the value of focusing national attention on the human rights of particular marginalized groups, notwithstanding the positions sometimes adopted by governments in failing to recognize and enact these rights. When human rights institutions highlight deficits in LGBTI and other marginalized groups’ rights, this raises public awareness of the issues and, importantly, awareness of the positions these institutions themselves adopt on such issues. For example, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission’s 2011 inquiry and report, ‘The Outlawed Amongst Us: A Study of the LGBTI Community’s Search for Equality and Non-Discrimination in Kenya’, led to the Kenyan Ministry of Health opening up its programmes for men who have sex with men. The inquiry also brought together community service organizations to produce a
statement on violence against LGBTI people, making recommendations that the government decriminalize LGBTI behaviours and subscribe to the 2008 UN General Assembly resolution and the 2011 UN Human Rights Council resolution, both of which supported LGBT rights (Kenyan Human Rights Commission 2011).

2.3. Links with existing government instrumentalities and institutions

It is important to develop clear strategic links with existing government instrumentalities and institutions when seeking to consolidate reforms. Strategically linking initiatives with municipal councils or district governors’ offices, such as those referred to in the Cameroon and Somaliland studies, can undoubtedly help to consolidate gains by local organizations in bringing about the inclusion of marginalized communities in local government. Notwithstanding this, it is also important to ensure clarity in relationships between civil society organizations and local government and to document these relationships. As noted in the Cameroon study, the establishment of written partnership agreements between the quarter development associations (QDAs) and municipal councils gave formerly marginalized quarter residents a quasi-right to participation, as well as an effective channel for communicating their development priorities to council authorities (Lambi and Dameni 2013: 329). Indeed, the Cameroon study authors continue to note that when the line between civil society and government responsibilities is ill-defined, government actors tend to ‘colonize’ the decision-making sphere. The authors go on to advise that, in countering this, it is important for inclusion reformers to develop a conflict resolution plan or strategy before engaging in any partnership with local government. Promoting the inclusion of marginalized groups almost always leads to them gaining more influence at the expense of actors previously dominating decision-making. Developing a conflict resolution plan in advance is critical—without it, dominant actors seeing their powers eroded can sabotage a participation process before it is fully established, or may simply set up an informal parallel process that maintains real decision-making power over the excluded group. The Cameroon study also shows the preparedness of members of a traditional council and a new participatory structure not only to resolve conflict, but to adopt an effective ongoing conflict resolution process (Lambi and Dameni 2013: 354).
2.4. Representation of marginalized groups in civil administration

The representation of marginalized groups in civil administration is a vital factor in overcoming political, economic and social exclusion. An important point previously noted by Baldwin et al. (2007: 7) and in a 2008 International IDEA expert consultation report on democracy and diversity (International IDEA 2008: 29) is that civil services and administrations occupied by dominant groups exacerbate the political, economic and social exclusion of marginalized groups. This has been confirmed by Gurung (2012: 2), describing higher castes in Nepal as exclusively occupying civil service positions and ignoring injustice suffered by ethnic minorities. Similarly, Hille et al. (2012: 14) note that Georgia’s Law on Public Service (1998) requires that all civil servants speak Georgian while the country’s Administrative Code (1999) prescribes that all administrative proceedings also be conducted in Georgian (Metreveli and Kulick, 2009 cited in Hille et al. 2012: 14). As the authors assert, these requirements deny ethnic Armenians opportunities to attain many professional positions within the civil service and therefore place restrictions on their livelihoods, particularly the livelihoods of those from the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. They also limit the access non-Georgian speaking Armenians have to public services, and reinforce the sense of isolation and being ‘apart’ from Georgia. Importantly, Armenian children and young people provided with access to language education in both their own and the majority language are likely to overcome the access to civil service and other employment issues encountered by adults (see Section 3.5). They are also likely to avoid the sense of isolation and being apart from Georgians during those years most crucial to their development of perceptions of difference to and respect for others (see Section 1.4).

Lastly, the Armenians’ sense of being apart from Georgians is likely to be further exacerbated by the fact that government officials, including the Samtskhe-Javakheti Governor, are appointed rather than elected, therefore attracting a low degree of legitimacy from the local Armenian population (Matveeva 2003: 165 cited in Hille et al. 2012: 14).

2.5. The costs involved in overcoming marginalization

Different groups will achieve political, social and economic inclusion at different stages and therefore the cost of overcoming marginalization can vary substantially across different marginalized groups. As noted in Sections 3.1 and 5.5, while particular marginalized groups are often assumed to be homogeneous, they are in fact often comprised of several (if not many)
subgroups, making them notably heterogeneous. This is particularly the case when it comes to young people (Maita 2012: 8) and people with disabilities (Sebuliba et al. 2012: 30), thus highlighting the importance of analysing where subgroup characteristics intersect and where they do not.

Sebuliba et al. identify an important implication of subgroup differences in the case of Uganda’s disabled groups, namely that different groups achieved political, social and economic inclusion at different stages. For example, to ensure that elections are accessible to people living with any kind of disability, it will not be sufficient to make a polling centre physically accessible. This solves the exclusion problems for most physically disabled people but people with vision or hearing impairments would struggle to cast their votes without additional support in the form of guides and sign language interpreters, respectively. Such guides and interpreters usually require more time to organize and additional financial resources as they are paid allowances on an hourly or daily basis. In contrast, this is not the case with physical access, exemplifying the differences in the measures required in making the voting process accessible to all disabled groups. There will be times when substantially different problem-solving approaches and timetables are required when responding to the various issues confronting marginalized groups and subgroups in overcoming discrimination and political exclusion.
Recommendations

1. That marginalized groups develop and offer training to politicians, religious leaders, media organizations and other key opinion-makers in order to sensitize them to the issues marginalized groups face. Most importantly, such training should help key opinion makers understand the benefits to all of including marginalized groups in political decision-making and the costs of their continued political exclusion.

2. That inclusion reformers should not rely on a limited number of political or religious leaders to create impetus for inclusion reform but should instead ensure that momentum for such reform comes from other sources, to mitigate against the possibility that leadership changes lead to inclusion reforms being compromised or reversed.

3. That inclusion reformers and their external partners recognize that marginalized groups’ preferred strategies and tactics for facilitating change are likely to be determined to a large extent by cultural and, in conflict-affected settings, security considerations. It is therefore essential for external partners to acquire a well-developed understanding of these dimensions prior to assuming their role in reform.

4. That reform measures include, where required, the integration of citizenship and human rights principles into formal and non-formal education curricula, including, in its appropriate forms, pre-school level curricula, and that such principles allude to marginalized people’s equality and the principle of political participation found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments.

5. That specific steps be taken ensuring young people’s and particularly young women’s participation in political discourse. This should include, for example, making instruction in democracy an integral part of the compulsory school curriculum, mainstreaming young people’s representation in political institutions and platforms such as political parties via ICTs and considering introducing quotas for young people to increase their participation in parliament and other representative bodies.

6. That state education ministries give priority to education for pre-school and primary school-age children on dismantling stereotypes, valuing respect for others and promoting an understanding of diversity as a highly important process in children’s development.

7. That groups seeking political and judicial reform of practices leading to exclusion bear in mind that in cases where domestic jurisprudence does
not succeed, international legal avenues can be pursued, if only to focus national and international attention on government action or inaction that can only assist in facilitating the reform process.

8. That support from human rights institutions or processes at the national and/or international level (e.g. national human rights commissions, UN Special Procedures including UN Special Rapporteurs, the UN’s UPC process or other approaches to the UN Human Rights Council) be utilized to highlight human rights deficits such as discrimination and/or exploitation and prescribe courses of action for governments to reform such practices and facilitate inclusion. Furthermore, in order to assist in engaging with human rights institutions, that marginalized groups make use of OHCHR assistance and training support provided by organizations such as Minority Rights Group International.

9. That marginalized groups working for reform at the local level consider strategically linking initiatives with municipal councils or district governors’ offices to institutionalize gains made in including marginalized communities in local and/or provincial government processes and structures. While doing so, marginalized groups and their reform partners should be clear in their relationships with local, district and provincial governments as to how they will maintain control of reform initiatives.

10. That states ensure that ethnic groups assume roughly similar proportions to their representation in the overall population within the civil service and other large-scale employers across state institutions to mitigate against the possibility of exclusion from state services on the basis of language and to ensure that ethnic minorities are not excluded from employment opportunities and ultimately, from economic participation.

11. That both states and reform campaigners avoid the common assumption that marginalized groups are homogeneous and therefore that subgroup within them necessarily confront similar needs, issues and resource deficits. For example, people with physical disabilities will face different issues and have different resources and skills at their disposal to meet these than those with visual, hearing or other impairments and disabilities.
Section 3

Other determinants of successful inclusion reforms
Section 3

3.1. Using different types of research

Different types of research can be used as reform tools. A number of case study authors cite evidence-based research canvassing the lived experiences of marginalized groups as playing a critical part in organizing information on the causes of exclusion, specific barriers preventing inclusion, the reform measures most likely to succeed and the impact of positive action measures such as quota systems in facilitating marginalized groups’ political inclusion. However, in several case studies the most important role played by research has been in its informing of advocacy and communication strategies, providing the data marginalized groups require in order to persuade decision-makers of the losses flowing from continuing discrimination against, and exploitation and political exclusion of marginalized groups—and, correspondingly, the gains resulting from their genuine inclusion in decision-making.

Box 3.1. ‘Beyond almost all politicians there are women in the shadows’: Cambodian women’s experiences of local governance

The narratives of four rural Cambodian women aged in their fifties ... illustrate their diverse strategies in overcoming obstacles faced as commune councillors. Cultural gender norms, hierarchical social structures and a patriarchal political culture dominated by party affiliation at the expense of individual candidate merits confront each woman. [Their] core character traits, personal dispositions in relation to historical and political transformation and distinct political motivations [are identified], serving to highlight how these women have reconstructed gender identities. [The case study] ... further analyses the role of a local non-government organization and the extent to which it has contributed to the women’s engagement in local politics.

The four women have developed different coping strategies to address traditional marginalization from public political roles. These are informed by political motivation, in turn influenced by family relationships, community engagement and activism; and experiences
of personal humiliation and discrimination. Civil society organizations have also played a key role in the realization of these motivations and in assisting women to manage their conflicting identities as they engage in the public political sphere while continuing to play their role in the private sphere. The findings highlight the need to recognize and work with diverse and individual political motivations and coping strategies to better respond to the negative impact of gender socialization on women’s engagement in politics.

From Gollifer, S., “Beyond Almost All Politicians there are Women in the Shadows”: Cambodian Women’s Experiences of Local Governance” in Journeys from Exclusion to Inclusion: Marginalized Women’s Successes in Overcoming Political Exclusion (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2013), p. 297

Specifically, the use of case study research methods in understanding women’s experiences (Gollifer 2013: 320) has been recognized as a powerful tool for informing debates on women’s empowerment (see Box 3.1), as it recognizes women’s own stories expressed in their own ways as the most effective means to raise awareness of exclusion issues. Discourse analysis of dominant groups’ engagement with excluded groups in politics (e.g. male commune councillors working with female commune councillors in Cambodia) also comprises a useful tool in understanding and analysing the power differential between men and women (Gollifer 2013: 307).

Furthermore, engaging excluded groups in the planning, conduct and analysis of research activities and results constitutes an important lesson in ensuring marginalized groups own the research process and its outcomes, while allowing them to better utilize those outcomes by translating them into advocacy gains. This was the case in Somaliland, where a non-governmental organization (NGO), Nagaad, undertook focus group research identifying why female candidates performed so poorly in the 2005 elections for the 82-seat lower house of parliament, in which just two women won seats. The study identified a number of specific barriers to increasing women’s political participation—including clan structures and conflicting loyalties; conservative Islamic teaching; lack of education; lack of finance; lack of confidence; and men’s resistance to power-sharing—that have since become a central part of Nagaad’s strategic planning and advocacy (Walls 2013: 187).

Concerning research methods, it is important to recognize that marginalized groups are likely to be comprised of an array of subgroups, sometimes experiencing a range of needs and issues translating into conflicting intra- and inter-group agendas (see Section 3). Research undertaken to identify these needs and issues must be sensitive to inter- and intra-group differences and should control for these by disaggregating results across a range of demographic characteristics (e.g. sex, age, ethnicity, religious affinity,
language group, geographical location, sexual orientation or disability). Researchers must also explain what the research will be used for, ensure respondents have provided their informed consent, make arrangements for feedback to be provided to participants, and put in place steps assuring that participants’ contributions will be treated with strict confidentiality before communicating this to research participants.

As several studies have shown, when inter- and intra-group characteristics intersect resulting in multiple disadvantages, it becomes all the more important to ensure that the groups that are often excluded from certain research methods are included in the research process. An example of this is the use of public meetings to gauge community sentiment on solutions to their needs and issues. Research and needs identification methods relying on such meetings or that simply rely on key informant interviews with only the most articulate commentators run the risk of identifying needs, issues and solutions in distorted ways. This is due to the fact that community meetings are often dominated by people familiar with and confident in expressing themselves in such forums, most often, older men. This can often discourage other marginalized groups or their subgroup members from speaking, explaining why larger community meetings alone can be a poor indicator of a community’s ‘felt needs’, and why its ‘expressed needs’ are often biased in the dominant group’s favour.

Bradshaw (1972) outlines the importance of canvassing four dimensions of need: felt needs, expressed needs, normative needs and comparative needs. Notably, several of the case studies reviewed as part of International IDEA’s inclusion research describe needs assessment and community organization processes canvassing at least three and sometimes all four of these dimensions. For example, in Lambi and Damen’s study, the Integrated Development Foundation (IDF), a community development NGO working in Bamenda, Cameroon, facilitated the inclusion of marginalized women and young people by undertaking extensive community organizing events in an attempt to reach people often overlooked in typical consultation processes. Project participants were organized into QDAs, with the written partnership agreements between the QDAs and the municipal councils giving marginalized residents a right to participation and effective channels for communicating their development priorities to council authorities (see Section 2.3). The events IDF organized to define community needs and issues provided forums for women and young people to define their own needs and the corresponding solutions, and in doing so the IDF canvassed both their felt and expressed needs. The needs assessment also encompassed consulting with key informants (normative needs) and identifying needs and issues
experienced by communities with comparative characteristics (comparative needs). In addition, IDF communicated through the leaders of various social, cultural and religious groups to announce projects, motivate group members to participate and, ultimately, build bridges between marginalized groups that had in the past been adversarial towards one another.

3.2. The role of the media in inclusion reform campaigns

The media can be a critical ally but it can also assume a hostile role in response to inclusion reform campaigns. Politically excluded marginalized groups adopting strategic approaches to building and maintaining positive relationships with media organizations have invariably reaped substantial benefits from this realization. Several case studies reviewed here, as well as the experiences of organizations participating in International IDEA’s September 2012 Inclusion Workshop, allude to successful media relationships producing pivotal results in swaying public and ultimately political opinion in the process of overcoming exclusion.

A case in point is the BWU’s highly effective skills development training and confidence-building processes, providing mentoring for younger women as prospective leaders in how to productively influence the media’s treatment of gender (Hedström 2013: 259). This has had a cumulatively positive impact in changing attitudes and behaviours towards women’s empowerment within both organizations and communities. It has also led to more visible media representation of politically trusted and respected women from exiled groups, providing Burmese communities with alternative and more inclusive interpretations of the roles women and girls can and should play.

Concerning the media’s treatment of LGBTI issues, both Malawi’s Centre for the Development of People (CEDEP) and Nepal’s Blue Diamond Society have registered considerable successes in cultivating media support. In the case of Malawi, as reported at the 2012 Inclusion Workshop, an initially hostile media was influenced by well-designed sensitization and awareness-raising media training on LGBTI issues. CEDEP prioritized developing personal relationships with journalists via the latter’s engagement in ongoing training and, through this, helped create regular media space for LGBTI issues. CEDEP now contributes weekly articles on LGBTI issues to a widely circulating newspaper in Malawi, in a column that has developed a considerable following, including among politicians. Using media so effectively as a vehicle for community education has contributed significantly to the attitudinal shift towards LGBTI people taking place in Malawi since
the controversial 2009 arrest of a transsexual woman and a man for holding a traditional ‘engagement’ party, and their subsequent May 2010 guilty verdict of having committed ‘unnatural offences’ and ‘indecent practices between males’ (CEDEP 2010).

In South Korea, the media, unsolicited by particular lobby groups, played a critical role in generating public support and therefore the political motivation for the government’s introduction of inclusive legislation establishing citizenship rights and cultural adjustment programmes, enabling foreign women immigrating to South Korea via marriage brokerage agencies to gain legal rights. This, in turn, has led to much broader acceptance of immigrating foreign women, thus contributing to their more successful accommodation within South Korean culture (Kim 2012: 6).

While the media has been shown in these case studies to be open to change and, ultimately, able to play a supportive role in social and political change, many media entities—including those referred to by Cuyco (2012: 4) or by Zouhali-Worrall and Fairfax Wright in their film Call me Kuchu on Ugandan gay rights activist David Kato’s January 2011 death—play damaging and indeed destructive roles in fuelling hostile sentiments towards marginalized groups, and LGBTI groups in particular.

This highlights the importance of reform groups formulating crisis management plans for instances when the media turns against them, including having clearly identified spokespeople who coordinate which messages to convey and when. Some groups (International IDEA 2012: 6) have identified the importance of using individual role models or spokespersons such as sports personalities, with either members of the marginalized group or sympathetic people from the majority group fulfilling such roles. Similar to Malawi’s CEDEP approach to relationship building with the media, Nepal’s Blue Diamond Society has emphasised the importance of holding ‘media-friendly’ events as part of change processes, to attract attention and encourage debate.

Lastly, actively contributing to community radio and television programmes—as has been CEDEP’s approach in Malawi—can play a critical role in protecting organizations against negative attention from other media sources, should it appear.
3.3. The importance of managing public profiles and the value of volunteerism

Profile, and specifically the lack of a high profile, can produce considerable strategic advantages, as can the spirit of volunteerism. One conclusion arising from the case study of the Wajir women (Kimathi 2013: 82) is that their adoption of a low profile, thereby allowing others to take the spotlight and benefit from women’s negotiating successes, was highly effective. This approach has enabled women to quickly gain the respect of all other stakeholders due to their effectiveness and lack of ego-driven motivation. Related to this was the Wajir women’s capacity to change roles and emphases depending on the circumstances, including knowing when to allow others to take the spotlight and when to take the lead themselves. This flexibility and the thinking behind it is a judgement that many reform activists would benefit from possessing.

In addition, being perceived as working for selfless motives based on a spirit of volunteerism was instrumental in the Wajir women’s ability to gain respect from all parties. This spirit of volunteerism and sense of ownership by excluded group members is pivotal in challenging marginalization. Volunteerism becomes even more important because marginalized groups often escape the radar of government or NGO support, making it important for people themselves to organize and fight exclusion, even without the promise of material benefit.

3.4. The timing of inclusion campaigns

Timing inclusion campaigns to coincide with events of international, national, provincial and local significance is likely to increase the pace and extent of change. In several of the case studies reviewed here, traditional power structures were already in a state of upheaval and local reform efforts coincided with these developments, while others dovetailed with national reform movements. Even in seemingly over-patriarchal cultures, there are always opportunities that marginalized groups can seize to overcome exclusion and inequality. As Walls points out in his Somaliland study, the challenge lies in defining the right moment to implement change strategies. In addition, progress at one governance level may lead to progress in another, causing a domino effect, as observed by Johnstone, Ubink, Heemann and Hedström in the Bougainville, Namibia, South Africa and BWU case studies, respectively (see Section 1.1).
Johnstone notes that transitional periods, such as Bougainville’s post-conflict time, often create space for marginalized groups such as women and young people to assume decision-making and leadership positions. The convergence of several events meant that the time was right for the People and Community Empowerment (PEACE) Foundation Melanesia (PFM) to introduce its mediator training intervention. After losing their previously strong power base, Chiefs finding themselves in a transitional phase were prepared to support women and other community members to become decision-makers, a theme also explored by Ubink in her Namibia case study. Furthermore, as noted by Douglas (cited in Johnstone 2013: 68), institutions or processes set up in transitional phases often continue functioning afterwards. This means that if marginalized groups’ rights can be protected from the outset during such periods, there is a greater chance they will continue into post-transition and development phases.

3.5. The uses of language

Language can be used to reconcile conflicting interests and gain support from the dominant group. Language also has a history of being used to present barriers to social and political inclusion. The use of neutral language has often been referred to in conflict resolution literature and its relevance in reconciling conflicting interests is evidenced in several case studies here. The clearest and simplest example of this comes from the Myanmar BWU case study. The BWU chose its name after lengthy deliberation, and despite the words ‘Burmese’ and ‘Union’ creating tensions with calls for independence by some minority ethnic groups, timely reference to the common enemy served to overcome many of the differences plaguing efforts to forge a unified position among conflicting ethnic and other women’s groups (see Box 3.2). This again corresponds to the conflict resolution literature’s reference to the importance of identifying a competing ‘out group’ as well as, importantly, identifying options for mutual gain across groups in conflict (Fisher and Ury 1991).

Box 3.2. Timely intervention in eleventh-hour negotiations, Myanmar

In September 1999, women representatives from ethnic minority organizations and the Burmese Women’s Union (BWU) met in Mae Hong Son, Thailand. This meeting was designed as a preparatory event for the second Forum of Women from Burma, scheduled to be held a couple of months later. Despite the ethnic minority women having informally agreed among themselves to form a kind of alliance, things again became very contentious. There were doubts about the actual intentions of the BWU in pushing for such an alliance,
and disagreements and discontentment surfaced on everything—from the purpose of an umbrella group to its membership structure. Things were breaking down. The BWU feared that it would never be able to establish a united women’s movement, inclusive of Burmans. Things might have ended there but for the intervention of a woman named Major Mary Ohn, a high-ranking officer in the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and a member of the Karen Women’s Organization (KWO). She was charismatic and passionate, and enjoyed a great deal of respect in the community, and used her influence to support the formation of a multi-ethnic alliance group. One woman recalls how Major Mary stood up to convincingly argue for the women to overcome their differences:

‘Major Mary Ohn said: “you have to remember we are not fighting the other ethnic groups, we are fighting the military regime. We don’t want to be hateful [towards each other]. We are all fighting the regime.” ’

The participants paid great attention to Major Mary and by the end of the meeting they were finally able to agree on the importance of forming a united multi-ethnic women’s movement.

‘The positive decisions at the end of the meetings were due in large part to [Major Mary Ohn]. Because other people, all younger, listened to her. She said we should support a women’s league. If Mary Ohn had not attended the meeting, the [Women’s League of Burma] might never have happened. Because of Major Mary, we could all agree.’


The intentional use of the dominant group’s language can be a highly effective means of influencing attitudes towards marginalized people, as clearly exemplified in AbouZeid’s account of Muslim women preachers gaining support for their work among conservative religious leaders. In moving from practicing as preachers in private homes to practicing publicly in mosques and organizing family support functions benefiting the increasing numbers of mosque attendees they were able to attract, the women used religious language rife with Quranic allusion and well-chosen references to respected religious figures such as the Prophet, his followers and wives (AbouZeid 2012: 21).

At the level of national language usage, language has been a key barrier preventing Nepal’s lower castes from participating in its governance and Sri Lanka’s rural poor from accessing its legal system. Until the 1970s, as in many countries with colonial histories, entering Sri Lanka’s legal profession and participating in its legal system depended on the ability to speak and read English (Cooray 1976 cited in Munasinghe 2012). In Nepal, the mother tongue of the country’s Brahmin, Chhetri and Thakuri higher castes was made the national language, a language beyond the comprehension of the
majority of Nepal’s 100 plus ethnic and caste minorities, speaking over 90 different languages and dialects. This played a major part in the lower caste population’s longstanding political, economic and social exclusion (Gurung 2012: 2).

Similarly, in Georgia, Hille et al. (2012) describe language emerging as a barrier after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Georgian Government prioritized the adoption of Georgian as the national language due to concerns about secessionist tensions, a legacy of several violent armed secessionist conflicts in the country’s post-Soviet period. This development left Russian, previously serving as the default language or inter-linguistic bridge, diminishing in use (Wheatley 2009 cited in Hille et al. 2012: 14). Lack of Georgian language fluency became a significant obstacle to ethnic Armenians’ economic and political participation, their employment in both the public and private sectors relying on Georgian proficiency. In addition, laws are only published in Georgian, making it difficult for ethnic minorities to be fully aware of their rights (Minority Rights Group International 2011 cited in Hille et al. 2012: 14). Moreover, Georgian language must be taught in the country’s 40 minority schools and due to the unavailability of bilingual teachers, this means that in regions such as Samtskhe-Javakheti students do not have a working level language proficiency because the Georgian language is not practiced in daily life (Lomsadze 2011 cited in Hille et al. 2012: 14). The study reinforces findings elsewhere (OSCE 1999: 4) regarding (a) the importance of training in a language minority’s own language when seeking to maintain and express their culture and, as other studies have shown (de Varennes 2012: 30), ensuring children learn more effectively by being taught in their own language; and (b) facilitating access for the language minority to employment opportunities via training in the dominant language.

Notwithstanding these challenges, Hille et al. (2012: 17) note that the Georgian Government has attempted to reduce the isolation Armenians in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region by improving their access to Georgian language training and changing university entrance exam requirements. More can be done, the authors note, by, for example, non-Armenians learning the Armenian language, facilitating equal access to educational materials in different languages based on the same curriculum, providing economic assistance ensuring cultural development, improving information on laws, and ensuring timely media access to news reports (Hille et al. 2012: 18).
3.6. The limits of participation

Participation alone is not enough to ensure equality unless it is based on citizen’s control. In her case study on Bougainville, Johnstone argues that the degree to which empowerment results from participation is limited and has to be considered in the context of prevailing power dynamics. However, this is arguably based on a limited definition of participation, as Johnstone alludes to Wojkowska and Cunningham’s description of participation as ‘being able to express one’s view’ (Wojkowska and Cunningham cited in Johnstone 2013: 61). Arguably, participation should instead be conceptualized in a more multi-dimensional fashion, such as that developed by Arnstein in her classic 1969 essay describing a ladder of citizen participation (see Box 3.3). The Bougainville case study provides an example of a situation where engagement resembles tokenism rather than serious participation. Another dimension of the participation process highlighted in some of the case studies is that participation by some constituencies will require time and space to evolve due to initial hesitation and lack of identification with the issues. The initial hesitancy of some minority ethnic Burmese women to engage with the BWU is a case in point (see Box 3.2).

Box 3.3. Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation

A typology of eight levels of participation may help in analysis of this confused issue. For illustrative purposes the eight types are arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in determining the end product.

The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of ‘nonparticipation’ that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enable power-holders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 progress to levels of ‘tokenism’ that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered by power-holders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these conditions they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no ‘muscle’, hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation is simply a higher level tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the power-holders the continued right to decide. Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power-holders. At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power.
Obviously, the eight-rung ladder is a simplification, but it helps to illustrate the point that so many have missed—that there are significant gradations of citizen participation. Knowing these gradations makes it possible to cut through the hyperbole to understand the increasingly strident demands for participation from the have-nots as well as the gamut of confusing responses from the power-holders.


A further lesson worth noting from Cameroon is that citizen’s participation will be better facilitated if appropriate legislation for participatory governance is enacted via legal frameworks assigning local government administration to elected officials rather than government-appointed officials. Furthermore, people are more likely to participate in local government when they are invited to do so with clear channels available for them to contribute (Lambi and Dameni 2013: 371). While affirmative action in local democratic governance may be an important step towards developing an inclusive environment, it should be kept in mind that, as noted by de Wijn (2012: 14), inclusion alone does not lead to empowerment—rather, the overall aim is to mainstream marginalized groups’ participation.

Lastly, an important part of empowerment is ensuring that marginalized groups are given all the necessary information, transmitted in ways that are meaningful to them, with which to make informed decisions about their situations. This is exemplified by companies negotiating with communities to extract natural resources from their lands. In many such instances, communities are often either bombard with highly technical information in a language other than their own, or provided with little or no information at all.

### 3.7. Exploring marginalized groups’ intersecting characteristics

Exploring intersecting characteristics can facilitate unity and conflict resolution when divisions occur based on a single characteristic. The Myanmar BWU case study highlights how promoting a common goal based on a shared identity in one dimension (in this case, gender) can work to overcome deeply entrenched differences in another dimension (in this case, ethnicity). This phenomenon was also evident in the Somaliland case, where women from different clan groups overcame their clan loyalties to forge a partnership based on both gender and their commitment to facilitate an end...
to the inter-clan rivalries that had been historically prevalent in Somaliland. The lesson these analyses provides is that promoting characteristics such as gender and shared experiences based on this characteristic can bind people together in ways that downplay differences arising from other characteristics.

This supports Hewitt’s (2011) findings that sharing stories and framing across difference in social movements can be very effective in fostering a shared sense of struggle and mitigating intra-movement differences by building on differences inherent in any group. The strategies applied by women in Myanmar and Somaliland demonstrate their success in emphasizing a common outcome while drawing on the strength that the different identities afforded them in achieving their objectives.
3. Other determinants of successful inclusion reforms

**Recommendations**

1. That advocacy strategies be based on research evidence reflecting the deficits resulting from discrimination, exploitation and political exclusion of marginalized groups and, correspondingly, the gains resulting from their genuine inclusion in political decision-making, similar to those articulated in the case studies under review.

2. That research processes actively involve marginalized groups in gathering, compiling and analysing research data, including the use of case study research using marginalized groups’ own experiences expressed in their own language, to stimulate community and broader level discourse among affected groups and political stakeholders in facilitating solutions and inclusion reform.

3. That research methods prioritize canvassing marginalized groups’ and subgroups’ own definitions of needs, issues and solutions to these as the most important information sources (i.e. felt and expressed needs), with additional information to triangulate this input procured from other sources including key informants’ analyses (normative need) and information reflecting the experiences of comparable communities (comparative need), using secondary source materials (e.g. comparative statistics). Importantly, data should be disaggregated, where relevant, by demographic characteristics such as, for example, sex, age, ethnicity, religious affinity, language group, geographical location, sexual orientation or disability.

4. That reform campaigners and activists undertake a strategic analysis determining the type of profile they should assume during various stages of their campaign, assessing the circumstances under which they adopt a lower profile, those under which they adopt a higher profile and the respective advantages and disadvantages of these options, together with an appraisal of the circumstances in which third parties should be used to add impetus to reform developments.

5. That reform campaigners consider the importance of timing in exclusion reform campaigns and, during their situational analyses and strategic planning, assess other developments leading to attitudinal and behavioural changes taking place or about to take place within political and social structures and the extent to which these will promote or inhibit their own reform strategies.
6. That careful consideration be given to the use of language in reform endeavours, assessing the advantages, disadvantages and circumstances under which dominant as opposed to marginalized languages are used in the discourse and instances when neutral language will assist in facilitating productive outcomes in negotiations between dominant and marginalized groups. This should be preceded by an assessment of the extent to which the dominant language has played a prime role in social, economic and political exclusion and the impact this has had on marginalized groups.

7. That states embarking on language nationalization processes be aware of the impact this will have on language groups likely to be excluded from participation in political, social and economic decision-making, that minority or at least inter-linguistic bridging languages be maintained and, preferably, that language diversity always be promoted.

8. That reformers navigating intra- and inter-group differences among marginalized groups or between marginalized and dominant groups consider the unifying potential of common characteristics and the narratives or stories people are likely to share because of such characteristics and their potential to bring people together in agreement, even when tensions exist resulting from other characteristics (e.g. religious, ethnic, disability, linguistic, sexual orientation or other characteristics).
Section 4

Key issues in customary governance
Section 4

4.1. Aligning human rights with customary values

The advancement of human rights and democracy in customary governance must be aligned with the customary values underpinning traditional norms. Cultural tradition is a concept often misused by dominant groups when explaining away marginalization. However, even among the most rigid of perceived cultural traditions, there are ways of finding historical and even current values aligned with gender, sexual orientation and other human rights equality principles espoused by reformers. As noted by the April 2013 Oslo International Conference Report on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013: 8), dominant groups in many Asian and Pacific island states often appeal to culture, religion or tradition to justify LGBTI-related violations, or assert a homogeneous view of ‘Asian values’, overlooking the inclusive traditions in indigenous cultures and communities, and the many diverse societies in Asia and the Pacific whose values encompass pluralism and inclusion. Indeed, from the case studies reviewed here, several key points arise concerning customary governance and change. These include the fact that no culture is static, monolithic and homogeneous, with all cultures invariably displaying inclusive forces; the fact that cultures shift over time, implying that exclusionary pressures may be relatively new and can therefore be reduced; and the fact that countervailing interests may emerge during a culture’s evolution or from sub-cultures within it. A very clear example of this is how knowledge about HIV/AIDS has led to some communities shifting from female genital mutilation to non-harmful symbolic rites of passage for girls.

Two case studies refer to pre-colonial inclusive traditions in Asia being displaced by post-colonial military conflict and patriarchal institutions such as the Catholic Church. The first example is from Henry’s study of Karen women, citing oral histories recording significant and powerful women, known as Kaw K’Saw Mu, who were as recently as the 1930s recognized as animist spiritual leaders and holders of knowledge and authority on land
use and traditional practices (Henry 2013: 273). In addition, anthropologists have observed Karen women’s significant roles in organizing social rituals, land rights and shifting cultivation (Marshall 1922 and Schneider 1961, cited in Henry (2013: 273).

The second example is from Cuyco (2012: 3) who states that nonconformity to traditional gender norms in the Philippines was not always seen as unfavourable. Prior to the Spaniards’ arrival and the subsequent spread of Catholicism, archipelago inhabitants adopting different sex or gender norms were neither condemned nor discriminated against. Cuyco adds that unlike the more recent Catholic denigration of women as unworthy of the priesthood, historical records indicate that women mediated people’s communication with the spiritual world. Men aspiring to become shamans or religious leaders were required to become like women in both appearance and mannerisms (Brewer 1999 cited in Cuyco 2012: 3). Historical accounts also reveal that during pre-colonial times, male-to-female transvestism and effeminacy among some men were accepted as conventional aspects of spiritual practices, with pre-colonial transvestic and effeminate men being the precursors of today’s bakla or bayot, both Filipino terms for effeminate men. However, the colonizers’ imposition of Western religious and cultural values led to the degradation of gender-crossing, the subjugation of women and the masculinization of Philippine culture (Garcia 1996: 129 cited in Cuyco 2012: 3).

These examples provide insights into how traditional practices and their underpinning values can, contrary to widespread belief, be both inclusive of marginalized groups and celebratory of their identities. However, in instances where customary governance, traditional practices or indeed conventional governance exclude marginalized groups from decision-making, a number of case studies provide evidence of the importance of understanding and utilizing the cultural values underpinning the social behaviours driving political exclusion, and aligning these cultural values to human rights advocacy. Johnstone (2013) highlights this strategy in her account of how women overcame exclusion to play a critical role in local Bougainvillean conflict mediation, while Heemann’s South African study demonstrates how customary governance’s inherent flexibility was used to find creative solutions to conflicts between national principles of gender equality found in the country’s constitution and the customary councils’ principles of inheritance based on the inheritance rights of firstborn sons. In describing this development, Heemann notes the often under-recognized openness of customary governance to change when this change is based on traditional values. Daannaa (2012: 31) supports the notion of the importance of understanding customary governance’s underlying cultural values when concluding that, in Ghana, building bridges between customary protocols on
the one hand and statutory law on the other—particularly where customs are long-standing—requires a deep understanding of customary protocols and local folklore and the ways in which they can be adapted to reconcile with human rights principles (see Box 4.1). Relying solely on the state’s legislative, judicial and coercive powers, he maintains, will not succeed.

**Box 4.1. The chief’s role in Ghana**

In Ghana, chieftaincy serves as a link between the dead and the living members of the kingdom. This spiritual aspect of chieftainship is often overlooked. A chief who sits with his or her elders in state sits not only on behalf of the living but also the dead, the names of whom are sometimes mentioned when pouring libation. This is one good reason why chiefs are, and must be, the watchdogs of our traditions. In all that they do, chiefs never forget the ancestors on the one hand, and the living on the other. Whatever is to be done is made to take cognizance of not only what is, but what was.

Today, in Ghana as a modern state, the traditional chief is also an important link between his or her subjects on the one hand, and the central government on the other. Ghana’s chieftaincy as an institution is highly elaborate, in that almost every little village or hamlet has its own chief. Thus, the institution is able to play a vital role when it comes to the explanation and relaying of government policies to local inhabitants, particularly those in rural areas. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized, considering the fact that there are no police or military in many rural areas in Ghana. Instead, it is the chiefs, under such circumstances, who take charge of maintaining law and order.

From Daannaa, H. S., *The Inclusion of Queen Mothers or Female Traditional Rulers in the Administration of Chieftaincy or Traditional Governance in Ghana* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2012) unpublished, pp. 5–6

This approach, according to Siloko, would also form the basis of the most likely long-term solution to post-1999 conflict and ongoing tensions in the Solomon Islands over land tenure and natural resource management. External pressures to exploit the islands’ natural forestry resources have combined with poor governance to prolong these tensions. In the context of land in Melanesia being acknowledged as a source of spiritual and material sustenance and a key determinant of group identity, any attempt to yield to pressures to introduce large-scale privatization and individualization of land tenure would likely result in deeply corrosive social consequences, sharp socio-economic differentiation and ultimately, the emergence of a landless peasantry (Allen 2008 in Siloko 2012: 34). A stable and peaceful future for the Solomon Islands depends to a large extent on reconciling customary land and sea tenure and Solomon Islanders’ rights within a framework of
social and economic development shaped by Solomon Islanders themselves, based on the traditional values associated with land tenure enabling collective control over land use (Siloko 2012: 3). One recent initiative here that has become good practice in the sphere of natural resource extraction is the development of community protocols, whereby the whole community group establishes ahead of time their values, needs and minimum requirements in the context of so-called natural resource development initiatives. If the process is completed early enough, it provides a benchmark before corporate representatives enter the negotiations and attempt to exert influence without reference to any community-wide agreement (Natural Justice, 2012).

4.2. Negotiating reforms

Where possible, reforms should be negotiated with customary governance structures. National, provincial and local reform endeavours failing to negotiate with existing customary governance laws or to adapt policies and frameworks to incorporate these laws and processes will continue to result in discrimination against and exclusion of marginalized groups by powerful tribal social structures. Marginalized groups, and particularly women, continue to be adversely affected by dual legal systems operating in countries where both systems are recognized but customary law fails to recognize advances made in civil law. This puts marginalized groups at a political, social and economic disadvantage, and is especially problematic for women living with disabilities and for LGBTI women.

Codified customary law often reflects the dominant ethnic group’s customs, denying the customary rights of women belonging to minority groups or rights accorded to them by common law. The Bougainville, South Africa and Somaliland case studies offer insights into how human rights can be incorporated into customary governance systems, with the South Africa case providing an excellent example of how judicial interpretations of laws based on the country’s inclusive constitution, together with creative applications of flexible customary laws, can ensure that customary systems conform to national law in protecting women’s rights. The South African Constitution enshrines a progressive Bill of Rights, promotes gender equality and aspires to be an instrument of transformation, making it something that South Africans hold in high esteem. Like other African constitutions, it recognizes customary law as well as the institution of traditional leadership. Many African constitutions—in fact most of the post-conflict constitutions of the 1990s—subject the application of customary law to the constitution. As noted by Heemann, it appears that this lesson, at least, has already been learnt.
4. Key issues in customary governance

Recommendations

1. That stakeholders seeking to reform customary or indeed conventional governance practices that exclude marginalized groups on the basis of appeals to culture, religion or tradition examine historical accounts of attitudes, behaviours and practices towards marginalized groups to verify that such groups have always been subjected to marginalization or whether more inclusive practices were once evident and marginalization is a more recent phenomenon associated with, for example, colonial or other external influences.

2. That national, provincial and local reform endeavours negotiate with and adapt policies and frameworks to incorporate and, importantly, reconcile existing customary governance laws and processes and that, in cases where customary governance, traditional practices or conventional governance exclude marginalized groups from decision-making, the cultural values underpinning traditional practices and behaviours be examined for the links to human rights that they often produce, and that these be introduced in facilitating local discourse and support for inclusive social and political change.
Section 5

Lessons for democracy cooperation and assistance stakeholders
Section 5

5.1. Marginalized groups’ representation in political institutions

Marginalized groups’ representation in political institutions is often compromised. Several cases, including Gollifer’s (2012) Cambodia case study, refer to the superficial or under-representation of women in existing customary or democratic institutions, with women often allocated responsibilities suited only to their stereotyped traditional roles. In contrast, in Timor-Leste, 30 per cent of members of parliament (MPs) are women, the highest representation of women in parliament of any Asian country. However, as Wigglesworth (2012: 8) has noted, women MPs in Timor-Leste reported that promoting an agenda for women requires considerable courage in the face of men’s and women’s belief that women in political parties should be responsible for the preparation of food at party meetings (see Box 5.1).

Box 5.1. The inclusion of women in decision-making in Timor-Leste

Women representatives were often described as being ‘active’ or inactive. A female member of parliament (MP) described ‘active’ as meaning having the courage to talk up and enter into debates, but estimated that only 20 per cent of women in Parliament and in Suco [local] Councils were ‘active’ (FRETILIN interview 1/10/11). This is perhaps a reflection on the traditions in Timor-Leste where a woman is valued for being quiet and staying at home. Being active requires a woman to move out of her comfort zone, or at least to extend beyond what is customarily expected of her. Consequently women representatives are sometimes perceived as ineffective, lacking power to make decisions and tokenistic representatives (Niner 2011). Several women MPs argued that this is less the case now than it was several years ago, describing increasing confidence and interventions that are now evident amongst women parliamentarians, particularly during their second period of governance. One MP illustrated this by describing how she was quiet at first but as she started to understand the issues and debating process she could engage actively (CNRT interview 6/10/11). It is
reported that when women speak out in parliament the men sometimes laugh and jeer at them (UN Women interview 23/9/11).


This corresponds with a 2008 IPU survey in which more than half of the women parliamentarians surveyed cited difficulties in balancing family and political commitments as barriers to moving into leadership positions (IPU 2008: 76). According to the survey, in the period 1999–2008 women occupied just 28 of 262 parliamentary leadership positions—that is, 10.7 per cent of all presiding officer positions in parliaments and national assemblies around the world (IPU 2008: 76).

Notwithstanding this, the Cambodian study noted women using their marginalization within local government councils to empower themselves by viewing the gendered roles allocated to them as roles that men are not adequately skilled to carry out, and using such roles as a platform from which to build their political knowledge and authority and then branch out into other areas. However, while this strategy may assist women in a gendered political environment, it reinforces the point made by de Wijn (2012: 14) that inclusion—or, in the above Cambodian example, part-inclusion—may not necessarily lead to empowerment for all, and that the overall aim of an inclusive polity should be to mainstream gender and foster genuine participation for marginalized groups in the sense that Arnstein (1969: 223) describes as citizen control.

This finding is supported by International IDEA case studies reflecting the struggles of people with disabilities in Uganda, where despite a quota system facilitating disabled men and women’s representation at national, district and local government levels, the quality of representation is low, with some representatives failing to actively fight for the disabled and ‘pursuing self interests’ instead, resulting in disabled people feeling betrayed (Musyoka 2012: 17). Musyoka observes that while Uganda boasts 50,000 local government councillors representing persons with disabilities across 56 districts, many people with disabilities are poorly educated, ‘unprepared and without adequate confidence to compete with non-disabled councillors’ (2012: 17). The author goes on to note that with a history of charity and handouts, many disabled people expect handouts, from their councillors, leading many councillors to ‘shy away from their electorates’—thus strengthening the case for training for political representatives, particularly those entering into representative forums for the first time. Added to this is the very serious challenge of violence and
intimidation directed at women pursuing parliamentary careers, an issue confronting women in Afghanistan, including women government ministers introducing gender and/or other reforms, as well as in other countries, such as Myanmar and Timor-Leste, reviewed throughout this publication.

The broader issue of capacity development for people new to representative forums is dealt with in more detail in Section 5.3.

5.2. Positive action measures

Positive action measures determining the proportion of marginalized group representatives in governance systems can, under certain circumstances, be effective in overcoming political exclusion. When compatible with the electoral system, quotas and reserved seats have often led to a significant increase in the number of women and members of other marginalized groups elected to office. Evidence exists indicating that the extent to which marginalized groups can gain entry into parliaments depends on both the electoral system used and the extent to which constitutional, electoral and political party laws accommodate marginalized or minority groups (Baldwin et al. 2007: 13–4). Evidence from Baldwin, Chapman and Gray’s research shows that reserved seats can facilitate minority representation in national parliaments while signalling goodwill on the part of the state and, as such, can be important in creating an inclusive environment where ethnic and religious minorities can identify with and feel a part of the nation, thus reducing the likelihood of separatist tendencies. However, in order to avoid dominant group backlash, the authors recommend that states also give clear explanations as to why such measures are necessary and how they can benefit the state as a whole. Most importantly, the actual causes of marginalized people’s lack of representation in the parliament, including their experiences of systematic discrimination, must be addressed, and reserved seats should not be used as an excuse for sweeping underlying problems under the carpet (Baldwin et al. 2007: 13–4).

Certain electoral systems, under the right circumstances, can strengthen minority representation in legislatures and governments, and improve chances of preventing a relapse into war in post-conflict scenarios, with evidence suggesting that list proportional representation systems are more successful than majoritarian systems in strengthening minority representation, although the benefits some systems have over others are always context-specific (Baldwin et al. 2007: 14). Norris and Krook agree that proportional representation systems, specifically those using gender-balanced party list tickets, have increased women’s representation in lower houses of parliament more rapidly than majoritarian systems (Norris and Krook 2011: 54).
However, as noted elsewhere, inclusion in parliamentary systems does not necessarily translate into effective representation and marginalized group empowerment. Two case studies referred to in this publication deal with the issue of the effectiveness of positive action electoral measures. The Cameroon study provides support for the practice of reserving seats promoting women’s participation at the executive level in QDAs, while the South African case study describes the way in which quotas in South Africa’s customary governance system have been severely compromised. A third study (Stigter 2012) assessing the impact of quotas at the local governance level in Afghanistan also raises significant questions about the legitimacy of quota systems and the quality of their participation outcomes (see Box 5.2).

**Box 5.2. Quota systems at the local governance level in Afghanistan**

… Despite the Afghan Government’s commitments to international conventions and its support in implementing the National Solidarity Programme (a programme based on equal opportunities for women and men elections for Community Development Councils and participation in Councils’ decisions over local community development projects) … gendered power structures appear to have maintained their control over these processes … with … traditional male power-holders selecting women representatives loyal to them in filling quotas, thus undermining the quota systems designed to improve women’s participation … rais[ing] significant questions about the effectiveness of quota systems in terms of the quality of women’s participation.


Furthermore, once elected to local government bodies, women councillors in South Africa (Heemann 2013: 138) and Cambodia (Gollifer 2013: 306) reported that their voices go unheard in the male-dominated council settings, reflecting the phenomenon referred to in Section 5.1 whereby people with disabilities elected to political institutions in Uganda have also been marginalized within such forums by non-disabled politicians (Musyoka 2012: 17). One manifestation of entrenched power-holders adapting to the imposition of positive action arrangements aimed at including previously excluded groups in decision-making is power-holders vacating decision-making forums themselves and creating their own informal parallel decision-making processes (see Box 5.2).

In contrast, another study describing the election of South Korea’s first female immigrant in the context of the quotas for women at the national
and local government levels supports the efficacy of the quota system and the importance of training candidates on political rights and participation (Kim 2012: 10).

Two conclusions can be drawn from these studies. First, the legitimacy of the process governing how women and other marginalized group candidates are selected as candidates for reserved seats or quotas is critical. Second, elected representatives, particularly newly elected representatives lacking formal education, are likely to require training and confidence-building measures to compete in the rough and tumble of political debate and negotiations (Musyoka 2012; Sajjabi 2012; Kim 2012; Gollifer 2013). In many countries, women in parliaments have created their own caucuses or networks to generate mutual support, with mixed results.

In the Cameroon case study, both reserved and unreserved seats in local decision-making bodies were open to any community candidates prepared to stand and elections were governed by independent electoral colleges according to well understood by-laws, and these processes were free from political interference. In contrast, both the South African and Afghanistan studies describe traditional male power-holders selecting women who were loyal to them to fill quotas, thus undermining a system designed to improve women’s participation. These conclusions correspond with International IDEA’s research findings on quota systems (International IDEA 2013), revealing that while such systems are moving in the right direction in balancing female and male representation in elected forums, gatekeepers such as political parties and traditional male power-holders, together with financial barriers, often compromise women’s and other marginalized groups’ entry into politics.

5.3. Developing leadership skills

Investing time and resources in confidence-building measures via leadership training, often coupled with literacy training and income-generating opportunities, has been central to successful inclusion campaigns. This has been particularly effective in Myanmar, where the BWU has used ongoing mentoring by more experienced group members working with younger members for external representation purposes, together with a rotating management structure providing management opportunities for inexperienced members. Political training programmes for younger women have been crucial in developing confident, politically astute female activists as role models for younger generations.
Similar successes flowed to the Karen Women Organization (KWO), basing its community organizing on the political education of women activists and a train-the-trainer process. While this approach has taken time to show results, its positive impacts have produced an exponential growth in the organization’s support base, as well as sustained political change for successive generations of women. Graduates of the KWO’s Young Women’s Leadership School seeking advancement within other Karen community-based organizations (CBOs) undertook a more advanced Emerging Leaders Programme running for ten months, reflecting considerable KWO investment in this strategy (see Box 5.3).

The research evidence from Uganda provides further support for the importance of training and mentoring in leadership and skills development for inclusion reform, and specifically the challenges confronting people with disabilities in gaining effective political representation. One of several deficits in the Ugandan disabilities sector—and one that is also evident among other marginalized groups referred to throughout this publication—is that, as mentioned above, elected representatives and particularly newcomers elected to reserved or quota seats lacking formal education find it very difficult to function effectively in the cut and thrust of political environments that normally present challenges to even the most experienced representatives.

Consistent with Section 1.1’s analysis, the absence of opportunities for rural women councillors in Timor-Leste to receive training in their roles and responsibilities is further exacerbated by their lack of literacy skills, making training for women councillors offered by international organizations and NGOs inaccessible to a large proportion of women representatives. In addition, the often uncoordinated and piecemeal nature of NGO-implemented training leads to many gaps in both the geographical areas covered and the competencies emerging from training outcomes.

**Box 5.3. Developing young women’s leadership skills in Karen State, Myanmar**

Within the Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) ... a new generation of Karen women leaders and community workers is emerging through programmes such as the Young Women’s Leadership School (YWLS), a ten-month intensive course followed by two months of field work. The YWLS curriculum covers community development and management; human rights, women’s and child rights; basic law and administrative skills; information collection and documentation (e.g. library skills and interviewing skills); Karen history and politics; Burmese and English language; reading and research skills; practical life skills (such as typing, crochet,
embroidery and cooking); and leadership skills. The YWLS programme includes a focus on public speaking, both to develop this particular skill and to build the general confidence of women in speaking on matters of politics, so that ‘through practising they feel more confident to speak out’. However, the confidence that young women leaders gain through their involvement with the KWO is based on more than public speaking practice alone. The organizing and education practice of the KWO offers a basis for collective strength which women can trust to support them in their efforts to speak out and take action for change. As one KWO interviewee put it:

‘We can say that because of KWO that if there is any problem that women have to face, that women don’t have to be afraid and keep silent, they can speak out and then they know that this organization will try to help them.’

Many graduates of the YWLS have gone on to take up key positions in the KWO and other organizations … These positions had not previously been held by women. One woman who has worked for the KWO and now serves on the executive board of the Women’s League of Burma was one of the first graduates to come through the school. Participants who are recruited from other Karen CBOs return to their organizations on completion of the programme, and the KWO follows up with them to check on their progress.

The KWO also established a more advanced Emerging Leaders Programme (ELP). This programme, which ran over ten months, covered a wide range of subjects including an introduction to gender; the history of Myanmar and the Karen; democracy and federalism; public speaking; economics and development; policymaking; lobbying skills and many others (KWO 2010: 30). The ELP ran twice in the period 2008–2010, with 28 participants graduating and returning to work in Karen CBOs … the YWLS and ELP programmes have greatly enhanced the capacity of Karen women to make an impact in the governance of their communities, and have also helped to develop cooperative relationships between the KWO and other CBOs … The KWO also supports women in their participation in the traditional justice system … To empower women and the community to participate in and access the traditional legal system, KWO gives training in customary law as part of its education programmes. It also provides general education for women and children in the refugee camps, running a nursery school project, adult literacy projects, and special education projects for disabled students, as well as providing direct support for women and children to engage in education.


The Myanmar experience suggests that, when carried out correctly, training in leadership skills together with literacy and confidence-building measures may also to improve the outcomes of inclusion mechanisms for people with disabilities in Uganda.
A further point requiring consideration when designing and implementing leadership and confidence-building training programmes is that the leadership model chosen for training is critical. A lesson from Mohan and Tabassum’s West India case study (2013) is that using dominant models of leadership based on the notion of power over individuals as opposed to power or capacity to facilitate the use of excluded people’s skills is counterproductive to and at odds with the inclusion goal.

Maita (2012: 38) recommends that training for young people’s organizations in Kenya be extended to cover internal organizational governance issues to ensure accountability within such organizations rather than simply expecting accountability from governments and their representatives.

References to training, ‘capacity building’ or ‘capacity development’ are frequent in the humanitarian assistance, community development and social action literature, but such processes often rely heavily on once-off or short-term training events without follow-up. Furthermore, they tend not to incorporate good training practices (see e.g. Hedström 2013; Henry 2013; Gollifer 2013; de Wijn 2012; Kamhawi and Underwood 2012; Solanki 2012; Wigglesworth 2012). Examples of elements of good practices in this regard include longer-term and field-based mentoring, providing opportunities for hands-on responsibility sharing between more experienced leaders and their less experienced counterparts; horizontal or mutually-supportive as opposed to didactic learning; and advanced level training providing the necessary follow-up enabling marginalized group members to acquire the decision-making, advocacy, negotiating, management and analytical skills required to reconcile existing traditions and culture with new roles, and effectively oversee reform campaigns.

An additional element of successful training processes often overlooked is the organization of post-training skills- and experience-sharing forums and ‘train-the-trainer’ courses. Even if using abridged versions of courses and their materials, participants provided with opportunities to impart their knowledge to others in their local settings respond very positively and as de Wijn (2012) has noted, this produces productive outcomes. In her analysis of training for women at the local government level in Cambodia, de Wijn notes that post-training evaluations found that training relying on sharing mutual experiences and generating mutually supportive strategies for women in local government succeeded in empowering local women leaders by increasing their confidence, building solidarity, sharing experiences and providing mutual support. This approach appears to have been far more effective than vertical teaching approaches such as cascade training, and their tendency to reinforce top-down relationships. Indeed, the horizontal self-learning and self-directed model was
identified in the Cambodia context as a ‘best’ practice in terms of its outcomes (de Wijn 2012: 11), and has since been replicated by organizations such as UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank and UNFPA (Touch 2011 cited in de Wijn 2012). However, as both Gollifer and de Wijn conclude, care should be taken when pursuing this approach to identify an organization with strong facilitation skills and an understanding of the approach taken.

Kamhawi and Underwood’s findings from assessing the training outcomes of the Arab Women Speak Out programme provide strong empirical and qualitative support for the conclusion that training methods relying on facilitator-guided approaches bringing together women from similar backgrounds to question their assumptions, explore their options and jointly plan for action have been highly effective (2012: 18–20).

Importantly, Solanki notes the challenge of preparing local communities to accept women’s leadership, recommending that this should start with institutionalizing the compulsory participation of women in government- or NGO-facilitated village development committees. While she sees this institutionalization as a difficult challenge in traditionally closed societies, she identifies civil society actors as strategically the most likely and effective facilitators of such action, through negotiations with apex traditional and customary bodies, and implementation via forums such as religious gatherings, tribal youth meetings or other meetings where the male constituency can be orientated on gender rights through their local leaders (Solanki 2012: 23).

Once marginalized groups have undertaken training, ongoing support has been identified as crucial. In Timor-Leste, after the introduction of a quota system for women, women MPs were sometimes perceived as ineffective and tokenistic representatives lacking the power to make decisions (Niner 2011 cited in Wigglesworth 2012: 9). Women MPs reported that this attitude is less prevalent now than it was several years ago, describing increasing confidence and interventions from women parliamentarians, particularly during their second period of governance. The Gender Resource Centre (Centro de Estudos de Genero) based in the Timor-Leste parliament’s compound, has assisted in building women’s confidence by providing research and information on gender issues together with confidence-building measures such as study tours for women MPs to learn from the experience of other countries in legislative issues such as the development of family law, gender equality law and gender budgeting processes (Wigglesworth 2012: 9).

Lastly, effective training and confidence-building initiatives require engagement with and support from all levels of government. Further, as in the case of Cambodia, support provided by donors and development
partners in ensuring that funding for the training initiative is conditional on government commitment may provide important leverage when governments are equivocal about supporting such initiatives (de Wijn 2012: 10–1).

5.4. The roles of humanitarian and political assistance players

The roles played by providers of external humanitarian and political assistance and cooperation can either entail crucial support for inclusion reform campaigns or actions compromising the progress of reforms. In an environment where human rights advocacy is highly sensitive, the links that Burmese and Karen women’s groups have forged with international allies in focusing the spotlight on Myanmar and specific human rights issues has been crucial to their successes. Through partnerships with external humanitarian and other organizations, subsequent international exposure has increased the support Burmese women’s groups have gained from Burmese people in the Thai–Myanmar border regions and elsewhere. International organizations and NGOs can therefore play important roles in highlighting human rights injustices and political exclusion on international, regional, and country-level stages. Indeed, international developments such as global debates on gender equality have played a critical role in women beginning to question the local status of gender rights. For example, Solanki notes that the UN Declaration of the Year of Women’s Rights, followed by the World Council of Churches’ announcement of an Ecumenical Decade (1988–98) of Churches in Solidarity with Women, triggered regional debates within India’s Christian churches and within the Manipur churches in particular. This contributed to the establishment of spaces for the inclusion of women in decision-making bodies and within the ordained ministry, and to the inclusion of feminist theology in theological studies (Solanki 2012: 20).

While broader strategies and recommendations for democracy cooperation organizations on how to work with national partners in democracy cooperation are referred to throughout this publication, some more specific recommendations for international democracy cooperation and assistance providers are worth noting here. These include the requirement that external support, to be constructive, must be built on local initiatives, as the Somaliland study concludes. Somaliland’s marginalized women fully comprehend the need to work actively towards an expanded space for women within customary and conventional democratic institutions. What they and other marginalized groups are often asking for, notes Walls (2013: 365), is support in undertaking their advocacy in more methodical ways, drawing on lessons provided by activists in other polities.
Specifically, external agencies can work with local partners in identifying and sometimes providing an understanding of general political and security strategies and tactics that community-based activists may have had relatively little access to. This amounts to a recommendation, as noted in the Somaliland study and repeated in the West India and Cameroon studies, that international support in building more inclusive and representative decision-making institutions should be deeply rooted in an understanding of existing institutional and community structures and their values and norms. Indeed, there is ample evidence pointing to the difficulties encountered and often also the harm produced when external actors attempt to introduce models for democratic decision-making without sufficient understanding or sufficient space for local activists to set and implement the agenda and monitor its outcomes.

Lastly, a commonly-cited recommendation for external democracy cooperation and assistance partners is to ensure programmes seeking to overcome marginalized groups’ political exclusion adopt a holistic approach to reform, exemplified in the West India study, where interventions to increase Muslim women’s political participation included orientation for religious leaders, awareness building for women and education programmes for children. In fact, entire communities were involved in designing and implementing solutions. This case study details how empowering women ultimately involves changing gender systems and their normative underpinnings, involving men as key gender system influencers together with young people and children as future agents of change.

Adopting a holistic approach to reform also requires recognizing that more than one group is likely to experience marginalization within a community or polity. Furthermore, there are hierarchies and excluded subgroups within marginalized groups (see Sections 2.5 and 3.1). These layers of marginalization between and within groups are likely to be interlinked. Therefore, to be effective, political reform programmes must address all elements of marginalization experienced by such groups.

5.5. The importance of development ethics

Reform processes must adhere to development ethics to ensure transparent and accountable outcomes consistent with the human rights principles pursued in reform campaigns. This conclusion has a number of implications for the planning and implementation of reform processes and programmes, particularly those involving partnerships with external agents. The following practical measures are based on the assumption that marginalized groups themselves are directing and implementing activities, as opposed to external agents acting on their behalf.
**Needs assessments**

The needs assessment processes that have been found to be most effective have prioritized methods canvassing the needs expressed by marginalized groups themselves. As discussed in Section 3.1, these needs are often overlooked in large-scale public meetings and written questionnaires. Smaller-scale meetings organized through word-of-mouth, or assessments involving home visits for less-mobile community members, are more successful in identifying needs experienced by people facing double or triple exclusion and marginalization (e.g. women belonging to religious and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, the poor and the geographically isolated, and people socially stigmatized on the basis of their sexual orientation or other characteristics).

Interventions building on existing structures and processes of participation will be far more sustainable than programmes creating new structures and overlaying these on existing structures, no matter how inefficient those existing structures are. Using available social structures such as self-help groups in which the participation of marginalized people is already institutionalized will generate greater buy-in and ownership than externally imposed structures and processes.

Similarly, reform initiatives based on local responses to locally identified needs invariably produce more effective and sustainable results than responses relying on a one-size-fits-all approach using external players and large-scale resourcing. As the West India case study shows, people are not and should not be seen as victims or passive recipients of support, but rather as leaders and partners in the development of their own communities using the existing knowledge, values, beliefs, perceptions and strengths of marginalized groups to lead the reform process. In this way, community ownership of the project is guaranteed and community buy-in will be higher.

**Implementation**

When implementing reform programmes in local contexts, organizations confronting a skills deficit should focus on developing staff belonging to marginalized groups as a long-term commitment, should this be required, rather than relying on recruitment strategies headhunting experienced staff from other organizations. Recruitment by international organizations and NGOs often drains scarce human resources in communities already experiencing conflict-related ‘brain drains’, unless such organizations commit to sustainable strategies for developing local staff. Organizations wishing to work on marginalized groups’ empowerment should work with local organizations already undertaking such work and negotiate partnerships, rather than duplicating existing programmes.
International organizations should also work to understand and support the strategies that local marginalized groups’ organizations are undertaking in combining autonomy with customary and community affiliation, rather than imposing external methods insensitive to local cultural contexts. Lastly, democracy cooperation interventions must reflect diversity and the empowerment—particularly the gender empowerment—of marginalized groups. These interventions should be based on principles of transparency, accountability, honesty, integrity, the inclusion of diverse participants and a firm belief in the power of unity, not only within the marginalized community and its subgroups, but also within the wider community of which they should be an integral part.

**Donors**

As well as supporting the independent work of marginalized group organizations, donors should work to ensure the mainstreaming of inclusion issues by promoting marginalized group’s participation and leadership through their programmes with other organizations. A case in point, described by Ruotsalainen (2012: 11–2), is the role the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) played in facilitating Maasai women’s inclusion in decision-making practices in Tanzania (see Box 5.4). In this respect, donor assessments of funding proposals must be based on excluded groups leading the project design, implementation and monitoring phases.

**Box 5.4. Including Maasai women in natural resource management decision-making**

One contributing factor behind the increased participation of Maasai women in [public] meetings is the approach used by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) in their sponsored natural resource programme called Land Management Program (LAMP). The most important aspect was to involve local stakeholders in the projects, including women from all different ethnic groups living in the target area. The programme was started as a response to conflicts over land [with] forest areas utilized by villagers taken over by the government and turned into a forest reserve, [restricting villagers’] access and utilization of the forest products, leading to a greater destruction of the forest, contrary to the intention of the reserve. A village-based forest management set-up [was implemented] where villagers … living in the forest could use the forest product [while] being responsible for protecting it from deforestation. The programme developed to include other natural resources in the same manner. Villagers … prepared Participatory Land-Use Management Plans (PLUMP), by-laws were adopted including regulations for settlements, protection and management for sustainable utilization of the forest areas, safeguarding traditional cattle tracks, grazing
areas and water sources. Activities involved stakeholders in different projects [working] with gender equality issues focusing on women’s and men’s different utilization, access and control over the natural resources. When the LAMP project started in 1995, gender awareness workshops were one very important component, making men realize why women should be included in the development activities and in the decision-making bodies funded by the programme. These workshops were aimed at villagers from different villages and ethnic groups in the district, local politicians and at government staff.


Funding proposals in themselves present an additional problem, and one that many marginalized groups report from their experience with donors. This comprises the very complex and time-consuming funding application process—a process considered impossible to negotiate by some groups, while others such as community based organizations, are essentially excluded by donors from applying for funds in the first place. This issue is addressed in the report ‘Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid’ (see Box 5.5). In short, donors should adjust their application and reporting procedures after taking into account the situations and capacities of their target groups, as noted by Anderson, Brown and Jeanin (2012: 152).

**Box 5.5. Four alternative steps for donor funding**

**Step One:** Early Listening Funding

All providers would engage with and listen to a variety of people in a prospective recipient country or community before developing a proposal for funding. Any aid provider could draw on a pool of funds made available by individual, or consortia of donor agencies for this purpose. Funds would cover costs of an exploratory field visit and conversations with many people in and around the area (with a lot of listening) to identify local priorities and options for pursuing them that would benefit from external assistance. Incentives would encourage providers to work together to avoid misusing the time and effort of people on the receiving side.

**Step Two:** Proposal Development

Providers and a recipient group (identified as trusted by people in the proposed area) would together construct a funding proposal. No templates would be required. A proposal would be expected to tell as much as needed to make the case that the plan is a good one from the points of view of the recipient groups (as well as other groups nearby who will not be included in the activity but who will be aware of it and judging it). This could be lengthy or brief. The rule of thumb would be that proposals make the case, provide alternative
scenarios of how the process of the work could/would likely unfold, define the time-span, and attach potential cost figures to these alternatives. Budgets would be based on an ‘up to but no more than’ figure.

**Step Three: Disbursement of Funds**

Funds should be easily accessible as needed. No draw-down schedule should be set. Funds could be set aside in some form of ‘bank account’ on which programme managers (which should include recipients as well as providers) could draw as needed (providing brief explanatory notes to the donor at the time of each withdrawal). Aid providers and recipients would together monitor the disbursement and use of these funds and provide transparent information to all involved to reduce opportunities for corruption or mismanagement.

**Step Four: Reporting/Accounting**

The rule should be simplicity, clarity, and honesty. Donors, aid providers, and aid recipients should decide together on appropriate timing of reports, ways to assess effectiveness, and mechanisms of accounting prior to any agreement on funding. Reports should be made available publicly, and recipient communities should not only contribute to them, but also review them.

Recommendations

1. That constitutional rights for marginalized groups, including the rights to vote and hold public office, be reviewed and any forms of discrimination be removed while consideration be given to positive action measures for marginalized groups, including specifying reserved seats or a requirement for legal quotas facilitating adequate marginalized group representation.

2. That states and political parties review electoral, campaign finance and political party laws regulating the nomination, campaigning and election processes for representative forums such as parliaments, and that consideration be given to adopting electoral systems likely to advantage marginalized groups (e.g. proportional representation with reserved or quota systems as opposed to majoritarian systems), and that those using proportional representation party list electoral systems present tickets accommodating marginalized groups to facilitate their access to seats in lower houses of parliament.

3. That marginalized group reform campaigners monitor political party selection rules governing candidate selection for quotas and reserved seat allocations to marginalized groups and exert pressure on gatekeepers such as political parties and both traditional and non-traditional power-holders to conform to rules governing transparent candidate selection.

4. That political parties consider adopting measures facilitating the entry of marginalized group candidates, and particularly women, into political forums, be they targeted recruitment, internal quotas and reserved positions, training, coaching and mentoring measures or those providing structured opportunities for marginalized group members to develop their confidence and skills, such as rotating their participation in decision-making positions, once recruited.

5. That external partners working with marginalized groups avoid once-off or short-term training events without follow-up and instead incorporate capacity development and training good practices to improve marginalized group members’ political representation and leadership skills. These should include longer-term and field-based mentoring providing opportunities for hands-on responsibility sharing between more experienced leaders and their less experienced counterparts; horizontal or mutually-supportive as opposed to didactic learning; and advanced-level training. Such training should provide the necessary follow-up enabling marginalized group members to acquire the decision-making, advocacy, negotiating, management and analytical skills required to reconcile
existing traditions and culture with new roles and effectively oversee reform campaigns. Where appropriate, skills development should also cover internal organizational governance issues, ensuring the capacity for accountability within marginalized organizations.

6. That, if necessary, external partners and particularly donors gain or leverage government support for and commitment to capacity development for marginalized groups in order to improve their representation skills and overall confidence as political representatives.

7. That external partners working with marginalized groups to overcome their social and political exclusion base their programming on an understanding of and a commitment to building upon existing institutional and community initiatives and structures. Added to this should be an appreciation of their underpinning values and norms. Importantly, external partners should recognize that they are likely to add value by supporting advocacy based on lessons from activists in other polities, such as those articulated throughout this publication. Assisting local partners to identify and understand political strategies and tactics tailored to the local context that community-based activists may have had relatively little access to is likely to be productively utilized.

8. That external partners avoid a one-size-fits-all approach using external players and large-scale resourcing and instead enter into partnerships viewing marginalized group members as leaders in the development of their own communities, and using the existing knowledge, values, beliefs, perceptions and strengths of marginalized groups to lead the reform process, guaranteeing community ownership of reform initiatives.

9. That, if required, external partners prioritize the capacity development of marginalized group members with whom they are partnering rather than recruiting people from other organizations to meet skills gaps, and that democracy cooperation interventions reflect diversity and marginalized group-empowerment practices based on principles of transparency, accountability, honesty and integrity, including the inclusion of diverse participants.

10. That donors ensure that international organizations, including NGOs, coordinate with each other and with local partners in their capacity development initiatives to avoid the exclusion of groups on the basis of geography, lack of literacy skills, and a piecemeal approach that historically produces geographical and competency gaps in training outcomes.
11. That donors work to ensure the mainstreaming of inclusion issues by promoting marginalized groups’ participation and leadership through their programmes with other organizations.

12. That donors simplify funding proposal, reporting and grant management processes and that their assessments of funding proposals be based on excluded groups leading the project design, implementation and monitoring phases.
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Notes

1 The other three impact areas are constitution-building processes, electoral processes and International IDEA’s focus on the relationship between democracy and development.

2 The Circassians are an indigenous population of the North Caucasus and are sometimes referred to as the Adygei. The Circassian population comprises three subgroups: the Kabardin, the Cherkess and the Adygei (Minahan 1996: 128 quoted in Hille et al. 2012: 4).

3 Tensions between South Sudan and Sudan since South Sudan’s independence have led to episodes of conflict, suggesting that Nijzink’s 2011 analysis requires revisiting.

4 The UN Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures are independent human rights experts mandated to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective. For information on Special Procedures, refer to <http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx>

5 Article 7 states that: ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.’

6 The two other UN bodies dealing with indigenous issues are the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur Rights of Indigenous Peoples.